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# CURRENT HISTORY

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# CURRENT HISTORY

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## EDITOR'S NOTE:

The Latin America that earlier last year was said to be on its way to a new democratic era has suffered a relapse. In Peru, a populist autocrat claims he has had to "suspend" democracy while he tinkers with it in order to make it work. In Venezuela, the military has tried twice to unseat an increasingly unpopular president because it believes it is in the best interests of the country. Brazilians, meanwhile, try to understand how the energy that mobilized hundreds of thousands to demand the impeachment of a playboy president has dissipated as nationwide attention has turned to the intrigue surrounding the murder-suicide of two soap opera stars.

This not so auspicious beginning to a new era leads one to question if Latin America has truly come to the "end of History" and accepted liberal democracy as the guiding political philosophy (Frances Fukuyama, the Hegelian neoconservative, tries to bolster his argument in *The End of History* by including Venezuela and Peru among those countries that have "evolved" like much of the rest of the world to liberal democracy—a good example of how labels can distort reality). The cynical answer to the question is to argue that Latin American governments and their military cohorts have seen the light of free market economics and the improved relations that it brings with the developed world. The latter is immeasurably increased when a democratic veneer is also in place.

While there is something to this, a broader view would perhaps note that events in Venezuela and Peru are part of the cyclical nature of twentieth-century Latin American politics, where military regimes have traded place with civilian government whenever the democratic experiment became tenuous. As long as the military retains the right to intervene—and political parties remain fissiparous—the cycle will continue, even if Fukuyama's "History" dictates otherwise.

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"The task of the Clinton administration is not to break new ground [in Latin America] but to consolidate and build on what has been accomplished, establishing an enduring relationship that best serves the interests and values of both the United States and Latin America. No previous United States government has come close to accomplishing that task."

## Clinton and Latin America: Facing an Unfinished Agenda

BY PETER HAKIM

Since President Franklin Delano Roosevelt launched the Good Neighbor Policy, Latin Americans have felt that they have gotten a better deal from Democrats in the White House than from Republicans. The noteworthy innovations in United States-Latin American relations are mostly associated with Democratic presidents. John F. Kennedy is linked with the Alliance for Progress. And Jimmy Carter gets credit for agreeing to turn over control of the Panama Canal to the Panamanians, and for making human rights the centerpiece of United States policy at a time when military dictators reigned in most of Latin America. Somehow Kennedy's responsibility for the Bay of Pigs invasion and Lyndon Johnson's decision to send the marines into the Dominican Republic are conveniently overlooked, as Latin American observer Mark Falcoff has pointed out.

In contrast, Republican presidents tend to evoke bitter memories. Richard Nixon's and Gerald Ford's administrations are associated with a policy of benign neglect. Ronald Reagan is remembered for his early efforts to curry favor with the military regimes in Brazil and the southern cone countries, and for his relentless interventions in the Caribbean Basin.

Yet Bill Clinton's victory last November left many Latin Americans uneasy. They had grown comfortable with the Bush administration and its approach to the region. George Bush had established personal relations with many Latin American leaders, including Carlos

Salinas de Gortari of Mexico, Carlos Menem of Argentina, and Carlos Andrés Pérez of Venezuela. During the Bush years most of the outstanding conflicts between the United States and Latin America were muted, and a few were even resolved. The wars in Central America came to an end. The foreign debt crisis receded into the background. Tensions over drug trafficking lessened.

Moreover, the Bush administration proposed a new United States economic partnership with Latin America—at a moment when the region's governments were worried about being ignored in a post-cold war world, as they watched international attention and resources focus on the former Soviet Union, eastern Europe, and the fast-growing countries of Asia. Bush not only undertook free trade negotiations with Mexico but also called for the development of a hemisphere-wide free trade system that would incorporate all the nations of Latin America. On the political front, the United States and Latin American countries increasingly worked together at the Organization of American States (OAS) to find ways to protect and promote democracy in the region. The 1989 American invasion of Panama proved only a brief setback in the steady warming of United States-Latin American relations.

### FEAR OF NEW FACES

It is thus no surprise that most Latin American governments seemed to prefer the continuity of the Bush administration to the "change" promised by the Clinton candidacy. Their main concern was that a Clinton White House would retreat from the hemispheric trade initiatives launched by Bush just as Latin American countries were increasingly counting on

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expanded trade and foreign investment to fuel economic recovery and growth. One source of anxiety was Clinton's pledge that America's own economic and social problems would be the central priority of his presidency. Another was the presumption that Democrats would be more protectionist, which raised doubts about whether the United States would sustain interest in regional free trade.

Latin Americans are not solely preoccupied with economic matters. Some are worried about Clinton's promises to take a more assertive stance on democracy and human rights; a few governments fear that they may be the targets. Others are concerned that an openly aggressive United States posture may upset the fragile consensus that has developed at the OAS and end up weakening rather than bolstering the organization's ability to undertake unified action to protect democratic rule.

Yet there was cause for uncertainty about the direction of United States policy more than a year ago—long before Clinton was nominated and Bush began to slide in the opinion polls. The Bush administration's policies toward Latin America visibly faltered on several fronts:

- In El Salvador, United States–supported mediation efforts by the UN finally produced a New Year's Day 1992 peace accord between the government and leftist insurgents—an accord that is being carried out, although by no means smoothly or without frustrating delays. Yet the United States seems increasingly bent on disengaging itself from Central America. Aid levels have declined sharply while approved assistance has been disbursed slowly and, according to the government's own reports, has not been used effectively. A few virulently anti-Sandinista members of Congress, led by Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), last year interrupted aid to Nicaragua for nearly six months. For most of 1992, both Nicaragua and El Salvador were without United States ambassadors as administration appointments languished in the Senate.
- The United States has been actively involved in OAS initiatives in Haiti and Peru, but neither of these efforts has made much progress in restoring democratic government. In Haiti—where the army ousted the nation's first freely elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, in September 1991—there is still no solution after 15 months, and the political and economic situation continues to deteriorate. In Peru, President Alberto Fujimori—after suspending the constitution and dissolving Congress and the courts last April—bowed to international pressure, including a suspension of United States aid, and called for the election of a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution and serve as an interim legislature. But that election, held November 22, was only a small step forward, and the United States and other OAS members appear ambivalent about keeping the pressure on.
- After putting up resistance to the Cuban-American community in Miami for more than a year, the Bush administration decided to support the so-called Cuban Democracy Act, designed to tighten the United States embargo against Cuba—in part because Clinton had endorsed the measure to better his electoral chances in Florida. This was something of a turnabout for the White House, which had taken some modest steps to reduce United States–Cuban hostility, and it was greeted with dismay by most countries in Latin America—even as they increasingly pressed Fidel Castro for political change. One consequence has been diminished prospects for United States–Latin American cooperation on Cuba.
- The Bush administration succeeded in wrapping up negotiations with Mexico and Canada on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was formally signed by the three countries in mid-December and is now ready to be presented for congressional approval. This is a historic accomplishment in United States–Latin American relations, the fruit of active and persistent presidential leadership in the face of substantial domestic opposition. If ratified, it has the potential to reshape United States ties with Mexico and open the way for broader hemispheric trade links. The agreement, however, took considerably longer to complete than had initially been expected—and ratification is now the province of the new administration and Congress, which leaves the outcome still uncertain. Two tough issues, environmental protection and workers' rights, did not get sufficient attention from the Bush team and must be worked out with Mexico.
- The administration's greatest failing was not devising a strategy for extending NAFTA to other countries in Latin America and creating the hemisphere-wide free trade pact the president had proposed in his June 1990 announcement of the Enterprise for the Americas initiative.\* Other elements of the initiative have languished as well. It was not until last October that limited financing was approved for a special investment promotion facility, and Congress has authorized only a fraction of the funds necessary for the reduction of debts

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\*For more on the initiative, see Peter Hakim, "The United States and Latin America: Good Neighbors Again?" *Current History*, February 1992.

owed by Latin American countries to the United States treasury. The White House and Congress share responsibility for the initiative's excruciatingly slow implementation.

These developments in United States policy last year disappointed Latin Americans. But so far they have not led to any significant deterioration in relations, which remain fundamentally sound. Opportunities have clearly been missed, but irreversible losses have not occurred.

## CLINTON'S CHOICES

President Clinton inherits a well-defined set of issues and challenges for Latin America. His administration has important decisions to make, but in the post-cold war era the policy alternatives will not be grounded in distinct and clear-cut ideologies. Nor will the choices be derived from grand visions of America's place in the world; none of Clinton's statements on foreign policy, either during the campaign or since the election, have offered any such vision.

Ideology will play a role, however. The new administration's policies and priorities in Latin America will in part emerge from political competition among groups associated with a diverse Democratic party: neoconservative supporters of the contras in Nicaragua and liberal human rights activists; proponents of free trade and individuals tied to labor and the environmental movement; advocates of special commercial relations within the hemisphere and globalists who reject regional trade preferences; and fervent champions of an active pro-democracy agenda and those calling for restraint in the use of United States power. The policies resulting from the conflicts and compromises among these different perspectives may not always be fully coherent or easy to implement.

Beyond this political tug-of-war, two factors will decisively shape and constrain the new administration's policy course in Latin America. The first is the performance of the domestic economy; Clinton is well aware that the credibility and success of his presidency ultimately depend on his ability to spark growth, reduce unemployment, bring the deficit under control, and increase international competitiveness. A sluggish economy will inevitably absorb the administration's energy and political resources and limit its capacity for international initiative. A dynamic United States economy, in contrast, would provide the foundation for an active and imaginative foreign policy. It would give the administration added confidence and clout to operate internationally. It would also expand the funds available for initiatives abroad and mute the cries for protectionist trade measures—both of which are of crucial importance for Latin America.

Political and economic developments in Latin America will be another powerful determinant of United States policy. In the past few years the region has

become a more compatible partner for the United States. Latin America's impressive democratic renewal, its dramatic shift toward market-oriented economic strategies, and its newfound willingness to cooperate with the United States on a range of issues have increasingly turned the region into an area of opportunity rather than a well of problems and conflicts. It was, for example, Latin America's enthusiastic response to the Enterprise for the Americas initiative that gave the initiative its importance back in Washington.

The region's future, however, remains plagued by uncertainty. Democratic politics are robust in only a few countries and human rights abuses are still widespread. Haiti and Peru have reverted to authoritarian rule. Mexico has made little progress in opening its political system. Venezuela suffered two coup attempts last year that left its democratic institutions badly wounded. Democracy in Brazil is under increasing stress.

Economic reforms have remedied long-term structural weaknesses in many countries but are producing sustained growth in only a few. Overvalued exchange rates, widening trade deficits, inflationary pressures, and high unemployment and underemployment are common throughout the region. Brazil remains the sick giant of Latin America, with persistent hyperinflation, three years of negative growth, and deep indecision about the direction its economy and politics should take.

The type and quality of Latin America's relations with the United States will depend on the region's capacity to deal with its own problems—its ability to sustain and deepen democratic practice, stick with its market openings, and achieve healthy economic growth. Failure on one or more of these fronts will reduce United States interest in the region and diminish the prospects for productive ties.

Since his electoral victory on November 4, Clinton has been upbeat about Latin America. He has suggested that Latin America is fertile ground for advancing the cause of democracy, stating that, "together, we can construct a genuine hemispheric community of democracies." He has emphasized the contribution a prosperous Latin America could make to economic revival in the United States, pointing out that if the region's growth had not been interrupted in the 1980s the United States trade deficit would have been 20 percent lower. To be sure, these expressions of optimism are partly diplomatic rhetoric. Nonetheless, the linking of United States economic interests to Latin America's economic performance, by an American leader whose agenda is dominated by the domestic economy, is good news for the region.

## NAFTA AS THE CORNERSTONE

NAFTA will be the first crucial test for the new administration. The fate of the free trade agreement will



affect the course of United States–Latin American relations more than any other single issue.

It would be a devastating blow to United States–Mexican ties if the United States were to reject or significantly delay NAFTA—after two years of negotiation, and with a signed agreement in hand. This could well provoke a resurgence of anti-Americanism in a country that clearly wants and expects NAFTA to be a reality soon. And aside from Canada and perhaps Japan, no other bilateral relationship is more important for the United States.

Once the accord is in place the stage will be set for free trade negotiations with other Latin American countries and for the possible development of a hemisphere-wide trading system. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine the United States pursuing free trade with any other Latin American country if it cannot achieve an agreement with Mexico first.

Clinton has consistently backed NAFTA. Time and again during the presidential campaign he expressed his conviction that free trade with Mexico would contribute to job creation and economic growth in the United States. In the final weeks before the balloting he endorsed the 2,000-page NAFTA agreement signed by the Bush administration and said he would not call for its renegotiation. He has made plain his dissatisfaction with the pact's labor and environmental provisions, and announced his intention to seek parallel accords with Mexico that deal with these issues. This, however, does not appear to present any significant roadblock, and should in fact facilitate congressional ratification and broaden public support. Mexican President Carlos Salinas has not objected to negotiating the additional provisions.

Given his strong public endorsement of the agreement, Clinton is unlikely to backtrack on NAFTA, despite the continued opposition of many of his political allies. The agreement will most likely be ratified this year, although the huge turnover in Congress makes the final vote unpredictable. Clinton artfully kept NAFTA from becoming a campaign issue. As president, he will likely move to conclude the agreement, after having argued that it is good policy—toward Mexico, toward Latin America, and for the United States economy.

Clinton is also on record as favoring the extension of NAFTA to other Latin American countries, leading to the eventual development of a hemispheric free trade system as proposed by Bush. But so far he, like the Bush administration, has presented no specifics on procedures, conditions, or timetables, aside from mentioning Chile and Argentina as potential early candidates for negotiations.

It is difficult to predict how much energy and political capital the Clinton administration will be prepared to spend pursuing free trade arrangements for the hemisphere. Nor is it clear how intense the

resistance from labor and other groups or how strong the support from American business would be. Much will depend on the performance of the United States and Latin American economies. Vibrant growth in the United States would diminish protectionist opposition, while economic advances in several major Latin American countries would help mobilize the backing of United States investors and exporters; sluggish economies would have the opposite impact.

Brazil may be the key. Only in Brazil are United States economic interests potentially as intensively engaged as they are in Mexico. If and when Brazil recovers economic dynamism it would quickly become a major market for United States products, attract large flows of United States investment, and appear an appealing free trade partner. If the Brazilian economy remains crisis-ridden, the United States may still negotiate free trade pacts with a few other Latin American countries (or try to bring them into an expanded NAFTA). But without Brazil—which has 40 percent of Latin America's population and economic output—there is unlikely to be a strong United States push for a hemispheric free trade system.

## SAFEGUARDING DEMOCRACY

While Clinton has pledged to work aggressively in support of democratic change and human rights, he has given no hint of how his administration might carry out that commitment in Latin America. One major issue his administration will have to address involves the mechanisms through which it would pursue its democracy and human rights goals. After years of political irrelevance, the OAS has recently emerged as a potentially significant actor in hemispheric affairs, particularly in organizing collective inter-American responses to safeguard democracy. Clinton and his advisers will have to decide whether they want to fortify the OAS role or whether they want greater capacity for independent United States action.

The broader issue concerns the kind of multilateral governance the United States would like to see emerge in the hemisphere. What mandate, authority, procedures, and instruments of enforcement should the OAS and/or other inter-American institutions have? Should Washington encourage the OAS to take on the kind of activist role the UN has begun to play globally? Is the United States prepared to shoulder the added costs?

Above all, strengthening collective action in the hemisphere will require the Clinton administration—unlike virtually all its predecessors—to resist the temptation to intervene on its own, even when the slow pace of multilateral diplomacy proves frustrating.

The first tests will come in Haiti and Peru. Alarmed by the prospect of a renewed flow of Haitian refugees, the administration may be tempted to displace the OAS efforts with more aggressive, unilateral action in

order to resolve a politically stalemated and badly deteriorating situation in Haiti. In Peru, on the other hand, where the antidrug war has continued to have priority for the United States, Clinton and his people may find the easiest course is to avoid further confrontation with the autocratic Fujimori government by moving to reestablish normal relations. That is the road the Bush White House appeared to be taking, and it would probably be endorsed by Latin American governments, most of which do not relish keeping the pressure on Peru.

If Clinton took these actions, OAS credibility would be damaged and its ability to respond to democratic breakdowns diminished. The alternative for the new administration—which carries no guarantees of success—is to stick with the OAS in both countries and try to provide the leadership and resolve necessary to make the organization's efforts more effective.

### CENTRAL AMERICA AND BEYOND

Democratic rule and respect for human rights are weak in every nation of Central America except Costa Rica. Abject poverty remains pervasive, and most of the countries are economically distressed. The United States still exercises considerable influence, and could contribute to political reconciliation, economic reconstruction, and the resettlement of large numbers of refugees and displaced people. But that will cost money, which is in short supply in Washington. And the president has announced no plans to reverse the sharp decline in United States economic assistance over the past few years. The Clinton administration could partially compensate for the reduced aid flows by providing additional trade preferences and encouraging increased lending by the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank. But to play a truly constructive role in Central America today, the United States will have to come up with more hard cash.

President Clinton will also not be able to avoid dealing with Fidel Castro's Cuba. Nothing Clinton has said so far suggests his administration would be disposed to change current policy, directed at squeezing Cuba economically and isolating it diplomatically.

Yet when the new administration begins to view Cuba as a policy issue, and not merely as a political matter, it may conclude that the approach of the past 30 years is unimaginative and unproductive—and want to set its own course rather than be guided by inertia. One potentially attractive alternative, put forth by a special task force of the Inter-American Dialogue last September, proposes combining continued economic pressure with new incentives for political opening, aims for a marked expansion of the flow of information and ideas to the island, and—most important—urges greater cooperation between the United States and Latin America to encourage peaceful change.

The choice for Clinton is whether to pursue a fresh and more activist approach, involving an effort to mobilize an international coalition and to begin bargaining with Cuba, or to continue waiting for the Cuban authorities to take the first steps or for Fidel Castro to pass from the scene. The former might well be more consistent with Clinton's approach to promoting democracy elsewhere, but it would be fiercely resisted by many Cuban-American leaders who are the driving force behind current policy.

The war against illegal drugs, especially its international component, has receded as an issue in United States politics; indeed, the issue was hardly raised in the presidential campaign. Clinton felt no need to communicate a strong position and he made no mention at all of the drug war in Latin America. All this suggests there may now be room for some significant policy changes—which appear to be justified on both substantive and financial grounds.

The evidence is overwhelming that United States antidrug efforts overseas have had virtually no impact on its problems with drugs at home, and probably never will. Given the scarcity of foreign aid resources, funding for drug initiatives in Latin America could be sharply curtailed, or directed to those initiatives that Latin American governments—not Washington—consider most important. Given its domestic focus, the new administration will almost certainly want to emphasize domestic measures to reduce demand rather than international anti-narcotic programs.

Clinton inherits a well-defined policy agenda for Latin America. He and his advisers will have important choices to make, but the issues will be familiar. One should not expect dramatic turns or reversals such as President Carter's emphasis on human rights, President Reagan's anti-Communist crusade in Central America, or President Bush's proposals for hemisphere-wide free-trade arrangements. With the end of the cold war, a significant bipartisan consensus has emerged in Washington on the issues that should be given immediate attention in United States–Latin American relations, and that consensus is largely shared by most governments in Latin America.

But the fact that the agenda is set and the issues are familiar does not make the challenges confronting the new administration in Latin America any less difficult or important. The battle for democracy could still be lost; economic progress in the region is by no means assured; cooperation between Latin America and the United States, whether on economic matters or on other issues, remains incipient. The task of the Clinton administration is not to break new ground but to consolidate and build on what has been accomplished, establishing an enduring relationship that best serves the interests and values of both the United States and Latin America. No previous United States government has come close to accomplishing that task. ■

"While history never repeats itself exactly, it would appear that Panama's current civilian democratic government is experiencing a . . . process of breakdown [similar to that which occurred in 1968]. The only remaining questions are how quickly it will collapse and how the United States will respond when it does."

## Things Fall Apart: Panama after Noriega

BY STEVE C. ROPP

**I**t is not surprising that three full years elapsed between the time that Panama's current civilian democratic government was installed after the December 1989 United States military invasion and the point at which its weaknesses became obvious. During this period, the government led by President Guillermo Endara has been seriously undermined. At the same time, opposition groups associated with the old military leadership that governed Panama from 1968 until 1989 have rapidly gained in strength.

The 20,000 troops of "Operation Just Cause" installed a fledgling democratic government in Panama whose civilian leaders took power while assembled at a United States military base. All were members of the Civil Opposition Democratic Alliance (ADOC), a coalition of parties that had won the May 1989 election but had been robbed of its victory by General Manuel Antonio Noriega. President Endara represented the historically popular Arnulfista party (PA). The vice presidents were Ricardo Arias Calderón of the Christian Democratic party (PDC) and Guillermo Ford of the National Liberal Republican Movement.

The disintegration of the governing party coalition began to occur almost immediately after the invasion. The seeds of the coalition's breakdown could be traced to Noriega's decision not to allow the Arnulfista party to participate in the May 1989 elections, forcing Arnulfistas to vote for the coalition's Christian Democratic party. Christian Democrats held a majority of cabinet positions and National Assembly seats after Noriega was overthrown even though their own contribution to this electoral victory had been marginal.

This perceived poor distribution of political positions among the governing ADOC parties led to tensions that quickly surfaced during 1990. Because party leaders did not fully trust each other, they negotiated an informal pact that called for the rotation of the National Assembly presidency until elections

were once again held in 1994. During the spring 1990 legislative session, it became clear that the Christian Democrats intended to use their majority position to control the assembly past their appointed time. As a result, the other ADOC parties formed an alliance with the military regime's Democratic Revolutionary party (PRD) to wrest control of the assembly from them.

Further complicating relationships in the coalition was the fact that the Arnulfista party was a mass movement whose members expected government jobs in the new administration. Early in 1991, the Arnulfistas expressed their intense displeasure with Endara for negotiating a pact with the Christian Democrats that granted them a large number of mayorships. This allowed the Christian Democrats to employ their followers in the country's largest cities and exclude the followers of their coalition "partners."

By April 1991, the relationship between the Christian Democrats and the other governing parties had reached the breaking point. The Arnulfista faithful believed that they were being systematically excluded from their rightful share of government jobs by middle class Christian Democrats, who viewed them as lower class riff-raff. And Endara reached the conclusion that the PDC was using its dominant position in the National Assembly to undermine his authority. In March, an initiative to impeach him for requesting United States support during a 1990 coup attempt had been introduced before the assembly's Credentials Commission. Even though the charge was eventually dismissed for lack of evidence, the Christian Democrats' role in the affair permanently embittered Endara.

The governing ADOC coalition fell apart in April when Endara removed five PDC ministers from his cabinet. Among them was Calderón, who headed the Ministry of Government and Justice, which controlled the police known as the Public Force. The collapse of the coalition led in turn to Endara's loss of control over the National Assembly as the Christian Democrats quickly negotiated new legislative pacts with other dissident legislators from the governing coalition and the opposition PRD. His Arnulfistas did not regain control over the assembly until the fall of 1992, and

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then only through negotiation of their own pact with representatives of the former military regime.

Endara's government was further weakened by feuding that broke out in his own party, and between various government branches and bureaucracies. While the PRD and the PDC managed to maintain a considerable degree of internal unity throughout this period, the Arnulfistas were not so lucky. Because Endara was viewed as not delivering on his promises of jobs for Arnulfistas, he lost control of the party in September 1991 to Mireya Moscoso de Gruber, the widow of party founder Arnulfo Arias. As the new leader, Moscoso continued to pressure Endara to remove members of other political parties from the government in order to create new sources of party employment.

By mid-1992, such infighting among government leaders had reached major proportions. In July, a member of the National Assembly sued the comptroller general through the attorney general's office for abuse of power and embezzlement. The attorney general suspended the customs director in September, charging him with corrupt practices. Shortly thereafter, the attorney general himself was the subject of a lawsuit brought by the head of the National Assembly's Drug Commission for allegedly unfreezing the banking accounts of notorious drug dealers. By December, two major personnel changes had resulted from this incessant feuding: Calderón resigned and the attorney general was removed from office.

Equally troublesome is the fact that these quarrels and divisions among civilian politicians are mirrored in the existing distribution of control over the instruments of force. During military rule, the Panamanian Defense Forces were all-powerful, with both military and police forces totally controlled first by President General Omar Torrijos and then by Noriega. All this changed following the United States invasion. At that time, a conscious effort was made to prevent the creation of a new military institution that would monopolize military power like the former Defense Forces. A new Public Force was established that assumed responsibility for police functions such as guaranteeing public order and protecting private property. But, in the spirit of implementing a more pluralistic public security model, further steps were taken to divide control over the instruments of force.

There are currently seven government-sanctioned organizations whose members can legally bear arms. Such a pluralist security model is of course fine in theory, as demonstrated by countries like the United States. However, for this model to work, a degree of cooperation must exist between various major political figures and the government institutions they represent. This kind of harmony does not exist in Panama, leaving the various armed organizations at risk of becoming the personal tools of various "power players."

Making the political situation even more dangerous is the fact that these government-sanctioned organizations by no means control all of the arms in Panama today. In addition, there are over 100 private security agencies that have as many armed personnel (about 12,000) as the entire Public Force does. Because of the high crime rate, and because businessmen do not trust the police, a whole new set of "private armies" has been created. This combination of large numbers of government-sanctioned military-police forces in the hands of feuding politicians with even more numerous private security agencies creates a potentially explosive situation should the existing political leadership lose control.

## A CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY

One of the most important consequences of the collapse of the ADOC coalition and the attendant feuding among civilian politicians has been a dramatic decline in the civilian political leadership's legitimacy. From the day he took office, Endara has faced serious legitimacy problems because his government was installed by a foreign power. His initial difficulties were further compounded by the military-designed constitution he inherited that incorporated many authoritarian legal provisions. Still, he and his vice presidents came into office in January 1990 with approval ratings of over 70 percent.

The leadership crisis, growing government corruption, and rampant crime have led to a continuing decline in approval ratings to the point that no major government figure has the confidence of a majority of Panama's population. According to a poll taken in October 1992, Endara's popularity rating stood at only 9 percent. The most popular political figure in the country was Panama City Mayor Mayín Correa, who commanded only a 31 percent approval rating.

No event better illustrates this dramatic decline in regime support than the November 1992 referendum on 58 proposed changes in the constitution. The government campaigned hard for the changes, which included a provision that would have forever prevented Panama from having an army. Although former Costa Rican President Oscar Arias—whose country does not have an army—lobbied in favor of a "yes" vote, 60 percent of the population abstained and 64 percent of those who did vote rejected the referendum.

Strong democracies can usually survive unpopular leaders, but it is clear that Panamanians are increasingly becoming dissatisfied not only with their leaders but with democracy itself. Over 80 percent continue to believe that democracy is the best type of government. Yet only 7 percent are very satisfied with the way Panama's democratic system is actually working, and fully 73 percent are somewhat or not at all satisfied. Panamanians remain opposed to a military coup as a means of solving democracy's problems, but support for democratic government has slipped badly, leaving

room for more authoritarian approaches to political problem-solving in the future.

This rapid decline in legitimacy has in turn created a climate in which the old military populist coalition has been able to reemerge as a potentially important political force. The military coalition had substantial popular support among marginalized economic and racial groups as well as close ties to certain parts of the business class. While Noriega's dictatorial excesses temporarily resulted in a dramatic decrease in the military government's popular appeal, this coalition has endured and continues to be represented by the PRD. When splits began to appear in the ADOC coalition and the government's economic privatization measures began to dramatically affect government employees and some businesspeople, the opposition gradually gained ground.

Reconstruction of the opposition began as early as January 1991, when the PRD and its affiliated parties won five legislative seats in a special election. Through tacit deals struck with Endara in 1991 after his break with the PDC, the PRD was able to gain renewed access to the media. By late 1992, it had negotiated a legislative alliance with the PA that allowed it to gain a leadership role in certain key committees. The PRD also benefited from the fact that Noriega had been tried and convicted in the United States of drug dealing and money laundering.<sup>1</sup> With Noriega in jail for 40 years, it now became easier for the PRD to portray itself as a civilian-oriented party of popular reform.

## RECOVERY, BUT NOT GOOD ENOUGH

Although Panama's economy has experienced real recovery, some serious problems remain that have further undermined the democratic regime's legitimacy. Most important, the national unemployment rate in 1992 remained close to 14 percent, and was much higher in cities like Colón. The private sector's inability to create a sufficient number of jobs to accommodate the rapidly growing ranks of young urban unskilled workers led to the emergence of new movements representing their interests.

One of the paradoxes relating to the breakdown of Panama's democratic regime has been that it has taken place in a context of partial economic recovery. During 1988, sanctions implemented against Panama by the Reagan administration sent the country's economy into a tailspin. There was an estimated 15 percent decline in GDP, and unemployment rose to nearly 25 percent.

All of this began to change following the 1989 invasion. Real GDP growth, which had dipped to -0.4 percent in 1989, climbed to an estimated 9.3 percent two years later. This gave Panama one of the highest

economic growth rates in all of Latin America. Per capita GDP rose accordingly to an estimated \$2,200 in 1991, and a projected \$2,400 in 1992.

Most sectors of the economy have experienced a strong recovery. Panama's dominant service sector, which includes the canal, the banking sector, and the Colón Free Zone (a tariff-free flowthrough point for goods and services), led the way. Panama Canal revenue and tonnage were the highest in a decade in 1991 and 1992, primarily because of changed shipping patterns linked to the Persian Gulf War. Banking deposits from multinational corporations and other sources began to recover but have not yet reached pre-invasion levels. And the Colón Free Zone, which is second only to Hong Kong in global free trade importance, set new records for total trade volume in 1991.

To a certain extent, this economic growth was a function of government policies aimed at re-establishing Panama's image as a dynamic capitalist country after years of military mismanagement. During the previous 20 years of authoritarian rule, the state bureaucracy had ballooned to over 150,000 employees. Many inefficient state corporations had been created, and the labor code resulted in domestic wages that kept the prices of locally produced goods too high to compete in regional and global markets.

To deal with these problems, the Endara government sponsored legislation that would privatize many state corporations and reduce tariffs in order to promote export-led growth. In preparation for joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Panama committed itself to new trade liberalization policies that would dramatically lower tariffs on industrial and agroindustrial goods.

While all these new economic policies responded to Panama's immediate need to restore global confidence after the Noriega years, it is also true that any Panamanian government in the 1990s would have probably moved in a similar direction. The stagnant market for traditional agricultural goods such as bananas and sugar, a slower projected growth in canal traffic, and the coming withdrawal of United States military forces, made radical restructuring along such lines a national economic imperative.

Other major economic problems confronting the government include a bloated public sector and a large national debt. The government work force has been reduced by some 10,000, which has led to increased discontent—discontent that will surely grow as the move to privatize state corporations continues. The national debt of some \$5 billion has not been reduced since the Noriega years. Although Panama's relations with international lending institutions were normalized in 1992, it has not yet normalized relations with foreign commercial creditors. This will serve as an impediment to the government's ability to borrow and invest for the foreseeable future.

<sup>1</sup>After a seven-month trial in Miami, Florida, General Noriega was found guilty on eight of ten charges of cocaine trafficking, racketeering, and money laundering. He was sentenced in July 1992 to 40 years in prison.

## PANAMA'S "BIG BROTHER"

Following the 1989 United States invasion, the new civilian government in Panama was immediately threatened by associates of the old regime. Members of Noriega's military establishment who were allowed to enter the new Public Force were less than enthusiastic about enforcing the law and as a result crime rates soared. Officers who had been permanently removed from the military engaged in a variety of terrorist acts. There were also several coup attempts. The most serious of these was launched in December 1990, when former Defense Force Colonel Eduardo Herrera Hassan and 30 of his fellow officers seized national police headquarters.

The Bush administration's response to these threats was to grant Panama's new government *de facto* protectorate status. When President Endara requested support following Colonel Herrera's coup attempt, some 400 United States troops were used to quell the unrest. United States Ambassador Deane Hinton made it clear that the United States would use all the 10,000 United States troops stationed in Panama to deal with any threat to Panama's civilian leadership.

By the beginning of 1991, it had become clear to the Bush administration that removing the mantle of United States protection would quickly result in a civilian or military overthrow of Endara and his supporters. In order to prevent such a development and at the same time reduce the possibility that United States troops would again have to be used, it was suggested that Panama create a rapid reaction force.

The Bush administration's policy of granting Panama's weak civilian government protectorate status has created a stand-off between the old populist forces and the new governing elite. Public opinion polls show that Panamanians generally support the use of United States troops to deal with any future coup attempt. Nevertheless, some Panamanians resent a continuation of the "big brother" approach that has dominated United States policy since Panama gained its independence in 1903. This became quite apparent during President Bush's June 1992 visit to Panama, when he was forced to cancel a speech and leave the podium under a cloud of tear gas that was used to break up an anti-Bush demonstration.

To a considerable extent, President Bill Clinton and his foreign policy team will face the same problems in Panama that confronted Bush. Foremost among these will be the need to ensure a smooth transition to Panamanian management and control of the canal under terms of the 1978 Panama Canal treaties. Talks will be concluded by the end of 1993 between

Panamanian, Japanese, and United States negotiators concerning the future of the present canal (Japan is one of the world's largest users of the canal). And planning will proceed for the withdrawal of some 4,000 United States troops and their families by 1995. The Clinton administration will probably have little difficulty dealing with these transition problems because of Democratic involvement in the treaty-making process during the administration of President Jimmy Carter.

The more difficult problem will be how to deal with Panama's looming crisis of political succession. During the 1970s and 1980s, United States policymakers gained a great deal of experience in dealing with succession crises that involved a transition from authoritarian to democratic rule. In cases such as Nicaragua and the Philippines, they learned through often painful experience how to disengage from dictatorial allies and to encourage the establishment of democratic governments.<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, policymakers are not as well equipped to deal with the kind of succession crises likely to confront them during the 1990s. In countries such as Panama, Venezuela, and Peru, they will face situations where the transition is more likely to be from some form of democratic government back to renewed authoritarianism. Hard decisions will have to be made as to whether weak and unstable democratic regimes like that in Panama are to be extended protection or allowed to collapse.

## NEEDED: NEW SOLUTIONS TO OLD PROBLEMS

The political situation in Panama bears a striking resemblance to that in the 1960s. A new civilian democratic regime had recently replaced a military-dominated government that held sway during the 1950s. But this new civilian regime soon self-destructed and on October 11, 1968, National Guard officers seized power.

While history never repeats itself exactly, it would appear that Panama's current civilian democratic government is experiencing a similar process of breakdown. The only remaining questions are how quickly it will collapse and how the United States will respond when it does. Perhaps President Endara will be able to prevent the government's collapse before the scheduled 1994 elections. Perhaps he will be forced to call for a constituent assembly. Or perhaps another military coup will be attempted.

In any case, United States policymakers will face some difficult choices. In the early 1960s, President John Kennedy faced similar tough choices when a number of military coups occurred in Latin America. By 1963, he had decided to make his peace with the newly emerging military regimes and adopt a more realistic perspective on the prospects for democratic change in the region. It remains to be seen whether history will repeat itself in this regard. ■

<sup>2</sup>See Robert A. Pastor, *Whirlpool: United States Foreign Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 122-144.



"[D]espite the accumulated mistrust and inequities of Salvadoran society, virtually all leaders across the political spectrum seem determined to put the civil war behind them and inaugurate a new era for the country. While extremists on the fringes continue to paint apocalyptic scenarios, the mainstream actors of national life appear increasingly committed to working with their former adversaries."

## At War's End in El Salvador

BY PAMELA CONSTABLE

The war in El Salvador finally came to an end in December 1992, after 12 years of fighting. The country's economy was ravaged, and its people psychologically scarred by the more than 70,000 war-related deaths. Moreover, a number of critical pieces of the peace process remained incomplete, among them the government's promised distribution of land to thousands of peasants and the purging and revamping of the armed forces.

But the success of the nearly 11-month-long cease-fire that led to the war's end was testament to the seriousness with which all major actors in the Salvadoran drama approached the process, as well as to the importance of United Nations monitors who prevented it from derailing. Today, the country's conservative elite and its leftist leadership still regard each other with deep suspicion, and rumblings from underground right-wing paramilitary groups continue. But a combination of war-weariness and growing pragmatism among leaders of all persuasions suggests that once bitter adversaries have begun to develop a *modus vivendi*.

The war's end, which coincided with the election of Democrat Bill Clinton as president of the United States, also closed a controversial and impassioned chapter in contemporary American foreign policy. During President Ronald Reagan's two terms in office, from 1980 to 1988, El Salvador—and neighboring Nicaragua, under the control of the revolutionary Sandinista government—became hemispheric flash points in an ideological struggle that divided the American government and public opinion as no foreign policy issue since the Vietnam war had done.

The Bush administration, which coincided with the collapse of Soviet communism and the decline of Moscow's regional ally, Cuba, adopted a more prag-

matic attitude toward the conflicts in Central America. After the Sandinistas were voted out of office in early 1990, administration interest in fighting Communist influence in the region diminished further. The issue became moot when United States officials played a pivotal role in brokering the peace accords agreed to in late 1991 by Salvadoran authorities and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), after months of complex negotiations sponsored by the UN.

The protracted war left El Salvador in virtual economic ruins, with damage to infrastructure exceeding \$300 million. More than half a million people—one-tenth the country's population—had fled to the United States, and another 500,000 had been internally displaced by the fighting, in addition to the 70,000 dead. With traditional farming and industry disrupted, unemployment was rampant, and an estimated two-thirds of the populace remained in dire poverty. Salvadoran officials have estimated it will take \$1 billion to rebuild the economy.

Yet El Salvador emerged from the war stronger and healthier than might have been expected. One reason was the traditionally high levels of productivity and civic organization in the country—which for years helped undergird the guerrilla cause. Another was the steady stream of United States financial aid, which totaled about \$6 billion during the war, as well as the annual \$1 billion in remittances from Salvadorans working in the United States. Finally, business investment has increased in the last several years, spurred in part by the conservative government's free market economic policies. Once political stability has been fully restored, El Salvador appears poised to achieve real economic growth.

### THE WORLD PRESSES FOR PEACE

The path to peace was long, arduous, and fraught with mistrust that had built up over the years of battlefield carnage, broken promises, ideologically charged rhetoric, and gruesome episodes of military and paramilitary repression. As early as 1984, Presi-

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dent José Napoleón Duarte—the first elected civilian president in decades—had tried to hold peace talks with the rebels, but these soon collapsed as conservative military forces gained the upper hand over Duarte's weak, centrist Christian Democratic government.

In the mid-1980s a new ultra-right party, the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), formed around a charismatic ex-army major named Roberto d'Aubuisson, who allegedly masterminded death squad killings against the left while rising to become the country's most powerful politician. In 1988 the party's candidate, Alfredo Cristiani, won the presidential election, and the guerrillas responded by intensifying their attacks. In November 1989 the rebels launched their most ambitious offensive of the war, nearly gaining control of San Salvador, the capital; more than 2,000 people were killed in the heavy fighting. In retaliation, an army squad stormed the campus of the Central American University and gunned down six Jesuit priests identified with the political left, along with their housekeeper and her daughter.

Yet by early 1990 the Cristiani government and rebel leaders had begun inching toward the negotiating table, and both agreed to accept UN mediation. Cristiani, a wealthy coffee grower and relative moderate within his party, had taken office vowing to work for peace, and enjoyed strong support from the Bush administration. The FMLN, having displayed its remarkable staying power with the offensive, believed it was finally in a position to win major concessions in return for laying down its weapons. At the same time, guerrilla leaders realized that most Salvadorans had no more stomach for war, while the defeat of the Sandinistas and Cuba's deterioration deprived them of important outside sources of ideological and technical support.

Of equal importance, the political climate began to improve significantly for the first time since the collapse of a short-lived reformist military-civilian junta in 1979. Several leftist leaders, including Guillermo Ungo and Rubén Zamora, returned from long exiles in 1987, although the left continued to be denied a role in national politics. A pivotal test for Salvadoran democracy came in March 1991, when elections were held for the ARENA-controlled National Assembly. The results were encouraging: Leftist parties won a number of seats, there was no organized campaign of violence to prevent their candidates from assuming office, and Zamora, leader of the leftist Democratic Convergence, was selected as a vice president of the chamber.

From spring 1990 through 1991, rebel and government representatives met repeatedly in Mexico City and later in New York, working under UN auspices to reach a peace agreement. But time and again the talks broke off in acrimonious disputes over land distribution, military reform, and the delicate timing of accord implementation as both negotiating teams were pressured by hard-line allies not to give in.

The FMLN saw the negotiations as a last chance to press for sweeping reforms they had failed to win in battle. Many rebel field commanders were reluctant to surrender their arms until they had concrete proof of official commitment to peace and reform; as a further guarantee of security, some demanded high-ranking positions in the new civilian police force. Government negotiators, in turn, were exhorted by ARENA and powerful rightist elements in the armed forces to minimize FMLN gains and retain for the military a measure of influence over the future government. Peasant groups, fearful of being cheated, occupied several idle properties, prompting rightists to issue dire warnings of mass takeovers.

But international pressure to reach an agreement was strong. The outgoing secretary general of the UN, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar of Peru, staked much of his personal prestige on the outcome of the talks; in the crucial final hours he literally delayed his retirement to ensure their success. Alvaro de Soto, the special UN mediator named by Pérez, worked incessantly to broker the talks and win the confidence of both sides. Moreover, diplomats from Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Spain remained in close contact with rebel negotiators, urging them toward an agreement.

The Bush administration, no longer overly concerned about Communist influence in Latin America, was hard pressed to justify continuing the \$85-million annual aid package for the unsavory Salvadoran military. The protracted war had become a major headache for United States officials, who hoped to usher in a new era of inter-American relations based on trade and economic partnership rather than ideological favoritism. Because of their close ties with the Salvadoran military, United States diplomats were able to intervene at critical moments in the talks, coaxing the government negotiators to make concessions and thus prevent the dialogue from collapsing.

In the United States Congress, key Democrats were infuriated by new revelations of Salvadoran army involvement in the 1989 Jesuit slayings, and they stepped up efforts to slash military aid to El Salvador. A congressional investigation commissioned by House leaders and headed by Representative J. Joseph Moakley (D-Mass.) raised disturbing questions about complicity and cover-up at the highest levels of the military. Moakley sponsored aid legislation containing both carrots and sticks that was approved by the House; an identical bill sponsored by Senators Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.) and Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) failed to pass the Senate.

The measure suspended half the annual \$85 million in aid and threatened to cut the rest if the Salvadoran government abandoned the peace talks or failed to conduct a "serious and professional" investigation into the Jesuit slayings; it also pledged to restore all \$85 million if the rebels withdrew from the negotia-

tions or violated the cease-fire. Democratic legislators proposed in addition that all military aid be converted for use in postwar demobilization and reconciliation. Congress's actions and the eventual trial of nine military men for the Jesuit killings heightened the Salvadoran army's resistance to the peace accords yet inevitably weakened its position at the negotiating table.

President Cristiani's role in the talks was also crucial. The wealthy, low-key business executive, initially scorned by the left as a figurehead for the reactionary right, emerged as a committed political moderate and pragmatist determined to steer a path between ideological extremes in rebuilding his shattered country. He encouraged the UN to play mediator, and cajoled military officials when a breakdown in the talks seemed imminent. Although sharply criticized by conservative civilian and military groups for making too many concessions to the rebels, he finally agreed to Pérez de Cuéllar's request to head the government negotiating team in the last days of 1991, and in that post helped the accords come together.

## A NEGOTIATED REVOLUTION

By September 1991 the two sides had reached an understanding on the basic principles of a peace accord. In November the rebels declared a unilateral cease-fire, and in late December, in a marathon four-day bargaining session that ended minutes before midnight on New Year's Eve, the former foes agreed to a sweeping yet detailed pact, which Cristiani and the top rebel commanders signed on January 16, 1992, in Mexico City. At the emotional ceremony, the new UN secretary general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, proclaimed, "the long night of El Salvador is reaching its end. . . . [T]hese accords will create a revolution achieved by negotiation."

On paper, the accords indeed appeared to be a victory for the rebel movement, which had originally taken up arms after legal means failed to secure a more just economic and political system. The pact established a cease-fire scheduled to last from February 1 to October 31, during which a series of steps was to be taken by both sides. The rebels would regroup in protected enclaves, surrender their arms under UN supervision, and gradually demobilize their estimated 6,000 to 8,000 combatants. In return the government pledged to radically reduce the power of the military establishment and to reform major areas of civilian governance. It agreed to halve the 63,000-member armed forces over a two-year period, to disband five counterinsurgency battalions linked to severe human rights abuses, to create a new civilian police force in which ex-rebels would participate, and to purge the military of abusive officers, based on recommendations by an independent commission.

As for socioeconomic reforms, the government prom-

ised to distribute land to thousands of poor peasants and demobilized rebels, reducing the size of large plantations and activating a land reform program that had been legally approved but never implemented because of violent opposition by right-wing landowners. It also pledged to revamp the judicial and electoral systems, and guaranteed the FMLN the right to form political parties and participate in elections.

Because of the intense pressure to reach an agreement, however, the negotiators left many key details to be worked out during the cease-fire, including the method of distributing farmland and the exact nature of rebel participation in the new police force. A national Commission on the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), with members representing the military, the guerrillas, the government, and political parties, was established and given a mandate to continue working on these problems. COPAZ created two separate panels known as the Ad Hoc Commission and the Truth Commission, which were, respectively, to recommend abusive officers for purging and to investigate grave cases of human rights abuses.

Not surprisingly, the extreme right was enraged by the accords, and threatened to sabotage them. The death of Roberto d'Aubuisson a month after the signing, following a lengthy bout with cancer, was seen by many Salvadorans as a symbolic end to the dark era of rightist violence. But shadowy anti-Communist death squads with names like Secret Army of National Salvation, which had remained relatively dormant during the negotiations, re-emerged to intimidate leftist labor unions, church activists, and human rights groups. In addition, some army officials were extremely uneasy at the prospect of forfeiting their long-standing power and privileges, and those with records of human rights violations feared and resented the possibility that they would be exposed and humiliated.

On the other side, some militant rebels were highly suspicious of the agreement signed by their leaders and remained convinced that it was largely a trick to get them to disarm. Many were reluctant to give up their weapons by the staggered deadline dates until they saw concrete proof the armed forces were complying with their timetable for reform.

Determined to reduce the chances that violence or other complications would undermine the cease-fire, Boutros-Ghali announced immediately after assuming his post that 1,000 UN peacekeeping troops and police would be sent to El Salvador to monitor the peace process. As during the negotiations themselves, the role of the UN monitoring mission, known as UNOSAL, proved a critical guarantee; observers have suggested that El Salvador could become a role model for future UN involvement in conflict resolution. Despite many tense moments, the presence of unarmed UN troops throughout the country, especially in rebel



enclaves, prevented any explosion of violence, and not a single serious violation of the cease-fire was reported.

Nevertheless, the cease-fire was fraught with technical and political problems, and the fragile trust that had enabled the peace accords to be signed eroded steadily. The rebels and the armed forces repeatedly accused one another of failing to live up to their side of the bargain and foot-dragging in meeting the deadlines for various steps. Guerrilla units refused to disarm on schedule, complaining that army patrols were continuing in their zones and that the government was moving far too slowly in creating a civilian police force and separating it from the armed forces.

Last June, UN mediators were forced to set more relaxed deadlines for both sides in order to prevent the process from breaking down entirely. In his first visit to Washington, rebel commander Joaquín Villalobos testified before Congress that "an atmosphere of systematic psychological terror" still pervaded the country, and that the government was backtracking on pledges to dissolve the feared National Guard and Treasury Police. Throughout the fall tensions mounted amid mutual accusations of bad faith and threats to abandon the cease-fire.

By October, a frustrated Cristiani was threatening to suspend troop reductions and military purges until the rebels had met their disarmament quota, while the rebels demanded the president act against abusive military officers. The UN was again forced to intervene, postponing the final completion of the cease-fire from October 31 to December 15. Despite deep misgivings and protests to the United States and Salvadoran governments that the army had failed to meet its obligations, the rebels agreed to demobilize the final 20 percent of their troops by that date, thus preventing what could have been a disastrous finale to the peace process.

## PURGES POSTPONED

The issue of human rights and military repression remained one of the central obstacles to bringing the war to a close. The Ad Hoc Commission prepared a secret list of more than 100 officers linked to abuse and corruption that was widely reported to include the defense minister, General René Emilio Ponce, and the deputy minister. In September 1992 the report was formally presented to both Boutros-Ghali and to Cristiani, who was required under the accords to retire or otherwise separate from the military all those named.

Many younger officers welcomed the purge as necessary in rebuilding the image of the armed forces, and also as a means of eliminating high-ranking officers from the military academy class of 1966, known as the "*tandona*," who had essentially controlled the army for years. In addition, the National Assembly in early 1992 unanimously approved a broad amnesty for past political crimes, known as the "Law of

National Reconciliation," that was designed to ease civil-military tensions by pardoning all but the most heinous abuses of the war period, such as the Jesuit slayings and the 1985 guerrilla assassination of four off-duty United States marines.

But to senior officers, especially those whose names appeared on the list, even forced retirement was an insult and an intolerable challenge to their power. They were especially angered by a series of newspaper ads taken out by labor and human rights groups presenting detailed charges against officers reportedly on the list. There was a spate of coup rumors, and a resurgence of threats from anonymous death-squad groups, prompting the rebels last November to halt their demobilization temporarily. Ponce declared the purge a leftist plot to destroy the armed forces, and pressure was brought to bear on Cristiani to let the general and the other top officers stay in their posts until their normal retirement this year. The UN refused the president's request to this effect, and when the cease-fire expired in December Cristiani still had not been willing or able to move against the officers.

In the final weeks before the cease-fire was due to expire, grim evidence came to light that supported charges the army had massacred hundreds of peasants, many of them women and children, in the village of El Mozote in December 1981. American journalists had interviewed witnesses to the massacre at the time, but both the Salvadoran and United States governments had derided the accounts as exaggerated and unsubstantiated, and the case remained in limbo for over a decade. But an international team of forensic anthropologists that began investigating the site in November discovered piles of bones and bullet-riddled skulls in a church cellar, including those of a number of children, essentially confirming the witnesses' stories.

Despite such revelations, the so-called Truth Commission, charged by the peace accords with scrutinizing serious past cases of human rights abuses, was stymied in many of its efforts. All last year the commission worked to determine which wartime violations should be prosecuted in spite of the amnesty law. But in addition to the military's recalcitrance, commission members complained that United States government officials and intelligence agencies had refused to provide requested documents and otherwise cooperate fully—raising new questions about whether loyalty to Salvadoran military allies outweighed United States commitment to the peace accords and to the truth about past abuses.

## THE JESUIT MURDERS TRIAL

The thorough legal and public airing of the 1989 Jesuit murders, in which the army was deeply implicated, served as a disturbing parallel drama to the peace process. The killing of six prominent priests, including the Reverend Ignacio Ellacuría, the Spanish-

born rector of Central American university, constituted the most horrifying political crime in El Salvador since the 1980 assassination of Oscar Romero, the Roman Catholic archbishop of San Salvador. And each new revelation in the case highlighted the conundrum that had for a decade plagued Republican policymakers in the United States: their ideological commitment to an abusive military establishment undermined their declared policy of reforming the military and bringing democracy to El Salvador.<sup>1</sup>

Immediately after the slayings the army denied all connection with the incident, and the Bush administration's initial reaction was to blame the rebels. Two months afterward, however, Cristiani declared that the army had been responsible and announced a special commission to investigate the crime. Some 47 military men were detained, but the army stalled at every turn, withholding evidence and refusing to cooperate with police. Despite efforts by United States-trained detectives and a persistent prosecuting judge, Ricardo Zamora, the investigation ground to a virtual halt by mid-1990.

The role of the United States government in the investigation was extremely controversial. The army unit involved in the murders, the Atlacatl Battalion, was an elite squad trained by American advisers, and all the accused officers had received special instruction in the United States; this dealt a blow to the traditional claim by United States officials that American training made the Salvadoran military more professional and humane. In some ways United States efforts hindered rather than helped the investigation by attempting to discredit several witnesses' accounts and by suggesting that blame was limited to one officer and a group of his subordinates.

In contrast, the investigators dispatched by the congressional task force in Washington provided important evidentiary leads, raised pointed questions about military behavior before and after the killings, and spurred the Salvadoran judicial system to pursue the case with new vigor. In a series of reports, the Moakley team charged that the army high command had worked to limit the scope of the investigation and protect high-ranking officers, that witnesses had been pressured not to reveal what they knew, and that evidence had been destroyed, including pertinent duty rosters.

<sup>1</sup>For a comprehensive study of the impact of United States policy and training on the Salvadoran military, see Benjamin C. Schwartz, *American Counter-insurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation-Building* (Irvine, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1992).

<sup>2</sup>For a detailed account of the slayings and the issues surrounding them, see "The Jesuit Case: The Jury Trial" (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, September 1991).

At one point, Representative Moakley charged that the armed forces were "engaged in a conspiracy to obstruct justice." This prompted General Ponce to suddenly offer broader military cooperation—a move Bush rewarded by releasing half the \$42.5 million in military aid frozen by Congress. Several months later, however, Moakley made an even graver accusation, saying that evidence suggested the murders had been planned by the high command, including Ponce and the air force chief, Colonel Rafael Bustillo, at a meeting hours beforehand. But the evidence was described as circumstantial, and Moakley's staff said their sources were afraid to come forward.

Eventually, only one high-ranking officer, Colonel Guillermo Benavides, was directly linked to the crime; he was charged in 1991 along with two junior officers and six enlisted men from the United States-trained battalion. Benavides's prosecution was a major concession by the army, which had never before allowed a senior officer to be put on trial for abuses, despite its lengthy record of human rights violations. (Making it even more unusual was the fact that the colonel was a member of the all-powerful "*tandona*" class.) But some observers believed Benavides was being scapegoated for a decision made by higher-ups, or that he had agreed to go along in exchange for a secret promise that he would later be pardoned by Cristiani.

In September 1992, just as the peace talks were reaching a climax, the trial of Benavides and the others began. Although Judge Zamora was regarded as a remarkably independent and courageous official in a weak and corrupt system, the court proceedings were in many ways a travesty of justice. No oral testimony was allowed, only formal written statements. Under Salvadoran law, the defendants were not permitted to testify against each other. Benavides and his two subordinate officers denied any knowledge of the killings; the four enlisted men had confessed to their roles when taken into police custody, but later said they were totally innocent and knew nothing about the confessions. The members of the trial jury were kept anonymous and were screened from view by a makeshift partition in order to protect them from retaliation. The defendants sat silently, staring straight ahead for hours while lawyers debated the case.

At the trial, Benavides was held responsible for the eight murders and sentenced to 30 years in prison; one lieutenant was convicted on a single murder count; and the six other defendants were acquitted on grounds they had been following orders.<sup>2</sup>

## MAKING PEACE

The final fulfillment of the cease-fire on December 15, 1992, ensured that a program of significant institutional reforms was under way. Nevertheless, major aspects of the peace accords were far from fully implemented, and a wide variety of political and

economic issues had been left unresolved. Only a fraction of land promised to peasants in rebel areas had been distributed, the deployment of the new National Civilian Police had not commenced, and judicial reforms had not gotten off the ground. Abusive officers had still to be purged, the final Truth Commission report on human rights abuses had not yet been released, and the extent of civilian control over the armed forces remained uncertain.<sup>3</sup>

More broadly, no paper agreement could hope to swiftly change the culture of hostility between rich and poor, military and civilian, left and right that had built up in a deeply inequitable society over the many years of war. Most people agreed that the economic problems of severe rural poverty, lopsided land distribution, high urban unemployment, and low private investment required major infusions of aid after the war, but there was sharp ideological disagreement on how best to bring about recovery and on who should manage the economic aid from abroad.

The Cristiani government was wedded to a strict free market philosophy, strongly endorsed by the Bush administration. By changing tax laws and creating business incentives, it sought to build a "maquiladora" industry of low-wage, duty-free assembly plants modeled after the manufacturing zone established by Mexico along the border with the United States. The government's program attracted substantial investment in 1991 and 1992, and officials predicted the nation's industrial sector would expand rapidly.

By contrast, the leftist opposition, including labor unions and former rebel leaders, demanded economic justice through land redistribution, wage increases, and grassroots leaders' involvement in the use of reconstruction aid from abroad. Labor organizers strongly protested the budding maquiladora industry, arguing that it cheated workers of a decent wage. In the countryside, activists charged that landowners were reaping large profits from uncontrolled development, ignoring environmental concerns, or—as highlighted by a court fight between a peasant cooperative and a coffee grower—reversing gains from the 1980 land reform law, which had confiscated numerous large plantations.

The most bitter and complex dispute revolved around the fate of farmland and development projects

in former rebel zones. To a great extent the war had been fought over land, after official efforts had failed to break up the country's large coffee and cotton plantations and implement a fairer system of distribution to hundreds of thousands of small farmers. Under the peace accords, the government agreed to gradually distribute about 650,000 acres to 7,500 former rebels and 25,000 peasant families that supported them, as well as to 15,000 demobilized soldiers. On the cease-fire's expiration, however, only a fraction of the land had been parceled out, partly because of delays in foreign government donations for the purchase of the plots, and partly because the government was allowing titles to go only to individual farmers, not to cooperatives or peasant groups.

As the war ended, the Cristiani government announced its ambitious National Reconstruction Plan, for which the United States Congress had in April approved a five-year, \$250-million aid package. Salvadoran and American activists protested that United States aid programs intended to promote peace and reconciliation failed to take account of the views and to allow for the participation of nongovernment community and labor groups. And though members of Congress stressed the need for grassroots participation, many United States and Salvadoran officials viewed local groups as too leftward leaning and unreliable to be trusted with money.

Yet despite the accumulated mistrust and inequities of Salvadoran society, virtually all leaders across the political spectrum seem determined to put the war behind them and inaugurate a new era for the country. While extremists on the fringes continue to paint apocalyptic scenarios, the mainstream actors of national life appear increasingly committed to working with their former adversaries.

In the business world, moderate lobbying groups with ties to multinational investors are gaining ascendancy over the traditional reactionary groups linked to the landed oligarchy. In the legislature, representatives from ARENA, the Christian Democrats, and the leftist Convergence are engaged in deal making as well as name calling, and former FMLN leaders are preparing to run for seats in 1994. Perhaps the most dramatic site of change is the fledgling National Civilian Police, in which former rebel combatants, army soldiers, and police are enlisting as new recruits. After 70,000 deaths, the young men who spilled each other's blood during 12 years of civil war are now beginning to work together to protect El Salvador's fragile new peace. ■

<sup>3</sup>On the outcome of the cease-fire, see "Endgame: a Progress Report on the Implementation of the Salvadoran Peace Accords" (Cambridge, Mass.: Hemisphere Initiatives, December 3, 1992).



In early 1992, President Fujimori announced a "self-coup" that startled international observers. "By the end of the year, having weathered a counter-coup attempt by the military... and having boosted his new political vehicle to a majority position in constituent assembly elections... , Fujimori was riding high. To an even greater degree than previously, however, he was also riding roughshod over his political enemies."

## Peru's Fujimori: A Caudillo Derails Democracy

BY CYNTHIA MCCLINTOCK

On April 5, 1992, Peru's 11-year-old democracy was shattered by President Alberto Fujimori. Fujimori, who had been duly elected 20 months earlier, suspended the 1979 constitution, arrested several opposition leaders, padlocked congress, and dismantled the judiciary. The *autogolpe* (coup by the president's own hand) was supported by the majority of military officials and business elites, and most important, by the Peruvian people. Fujimori emerged a new caudillo, destroying the conventional wisdom that institutions, whether civilian or military, had become more important than individual leaders in Peru and elsewhere in Latin America.

While the vast majority of intellectuals and political leaders condemned the coup, Fujimori's move was supported by most citizens; the president's approval rating stood at 60 percent or higher throughout the year. Most Peruvians seemed to believe that the democratic regime as it had been fashioned had failed. Since 1980, when the first presidential elections in 17 years were held, living standards had plummeted and political violence had surged. International concern with the Peruvian people's plight had been minimal at best (primarily because the nation's two presidents during the 1980s failed to reach international agreements about servicing the foreign debt, to shift toward freer markets, or to advance significantly in the drug war). Suffering drastically more severe poverty and more pervasive political terror than at the onset of the 1980 constitutional regime, Peruvians believed that, after 11 years, it was time for a change.

Yet, while Peruvians wanted an improvement in their lives, they were not clear about the political means to that end. Democracy was not being rejected in principle. President Fujimori based the legitimacy of his "Government of Emergency and National Reconstruction" in part on a promise to build a "true democracy," and emphasized popular support for his measures: "In Peru it is the people who are sovereign." And indeed, a majority of Peruvians expressed the view that the Fujimori government was "democratic."

By August, it appeared dubious that Fujimori was sufficiently improving conditions to retain power. The economy remained in desperate straits. Preliminary estimates for 1992 suggested a decline of about 3 percent in gross domestic product. Wages, salaries, and employment—which had fallen to rock-bottom levels after the 1990 economic reform labeled "Fujishock"—had not recovered. Especially after unprecedentedly large and bloody terrorist attacks in Lima in July, the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) guerrilla movement appeared to be inexorably approaching its goal of taking over the state. An effective anti-drug effort seemed as illusory as ever.

But, on September 12, 1992, Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, the founder and leader of the Shining Path, was captured in his Lima hideout by the National Directorate Against Terrorism (DINCOTE). Not only was Guzmán captured, but many other key Sendero leaders were as well. Although President Fujimori had not even been notified of the pending capture of the Shining Path leader, he claimed credit for an impeccable police operation that transformed Peru's political equations overnight.

By the end of the year, having weathered a counter-coup attempt by the military on November 13 and having boosted his new political vehicle to a majority position in constituent assembly elections on November 22, Fujimori was riding high. To an even greater degree than previously, however, he was also riding roughshod over his political enemies. While the presi-

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dent seemed likely to continue to govern, a more militant domestic political opposition also seemed likely.

## AN ERODING DEMOCRACY

Political analysts talk of "new democracies" as if they are more vulnerable than older democracies. But, by the early 1990s, Peru's democratic institutions were actually weaker than they had been a decade before. The primary reasons for their erosion were twofold: the economic plummet and human-rights abuses by guerrillas and security forces.

Peru's economic decline over the last decade is unparalleled in South America. By 1989, the real minimum wage was a mere 23 percent of its value in 1980, in contrast to a 75 percent figure for the region as a whole. The decline in Peru's real minimum wage was the steepest by 13 percentage points among the 19 Latin American nations for which figures were reported. Moreover, after the "Fujishock," wages plunged further to barely half 1989 levels. By mid-1991, "critical poverty" (specified as a per capita income of \$15.50 per month in a nation where the cost-of-living is as high as it is in the United States) afflicted about half the population. The Fujimori government failed to implement a social emergency program that might have assured at least some subsistence for the country's citizens.

The economic disaster eroded Peruvian democracy in various ways. Without resources, the state was no longer providing the services that are a customary source of legitimacy. Dismally paid state employees (including soldiers, police, and judges) were demoralized, and more likely to be tempted by bribes and extortion schemes. Also, since workers were more fearful of losing their jobs, they were less active in labor unions, traditionally a major means of political participation. Increasingly compelled to work numerous jobs and/or offer services informally, Peruvians had little or no time for civic organization.

The Shining Path's expansion also eroded the democratic state. A key guerrilla strategy was to target leaders who opposed them or represented an alternative. Between 1988 and August 1992, more than 400 political authorities were killed by terrorists; accordingly, local authorities were increasingly absent from

rural areas, or beholden to the guerrillas. In 1991 and 1992, the Shining Path more frequently targeted civic leaders, such as priests and leaders of community food programs. One of the group's most egregious crimes was the killing on February 15, 1992, of community activist María Elena Moyano during a celebration for the "glass-of-milk" program in Villa El Salvador, a shantytown that was traditionally a stronghold of the democratic political left; terrorists dynamited her body to pieces in front of her children. Said a community organizer: "We were practically defeated by fear."

By the early 1990s, more than half of Peru's citizens were living in "emergency zones." In most of these zones, military officials were the maximum authority, and human-rights abuses were flagrant. The number of individuals disappeared or extrajudicially executed by Peruvian security forces was estimated at 328 in 1990 and 399 in 1991—making Peru's human-rights record the worst in the Western Hemisphere. As travel by journalists and human-rights monitors to conflicted areas became ever more perilous and as victims' relatives became more fearful of reporting violations, the actual number of disappearances and extrajudicial executions was probably greater than the official figures showed.<sup>1</sup>

Peru's major political parties were debilitated, having failed to lead effectively or build solid networks of supporters. The parties that had governed during the 1980s—Popular Action (AP) in alliance with the Popular Christian party (PPC) between 1980 and 1985 and the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) from 1985 to 1990—were perceived to have performed badly and were widely discredited. For much of 1990 and 1991, APRA and its former president, Alan García Pérez, were mired in charges of corruption. The only other major parties that had been active throughout the 1980s that were still competing in the 1990 election were leftist; these parties had constituted the United Left, but by 1990 this coalition had ruptured. Of course, the left was also weakened by the demise of the Soviet bloc and increasing ideological uncertainty.

Nor was Fujimori's party, Cambio '90 (Change '90), well organized or coherent.<sup>2</sup> Formed for the 1990 elections as Fujimori's political vehicle, its members were politically inexperienced. The party brought together primarily small-business groups and Peru's evangelical Protestant community (disillusioned by Fujimori's government, some evangelical Protestant legislators abandoned the party in 1991).

The judiciary reflected the problems undermining Peru's democracy. During the early 1990s, the conviction rate for cases of terrorism was less than 10 percent; judges released about 200 suspected rebels in the first 20 months of Fujimori's government. Sometimes judges were persuaded to free terrorist suspects by bribes; sometimes, by threats.

<sup>1</sup>Francisco Soberón Garrido, executive committee member of Peru's National Human Rights Coordinating Committee, in Washington, D.C., February 7, 1991. In his talk, Soberón estimated the number of 1990 disappearances in one province to have been almost as high as the official figure for the nation as a whole.

<sup>2</sup>For background on the party, the 1990 election, and the new government's first six months, see David P. Werlich, "Fujimori and the 'Disaster' in Peru," *Current History*, vol. 90, no. 553 (February 1991).

Often the criminal code was inadequate; it was not a crime, for example, to be a member of the Shining Path. While Fujimori introduced a major counterinsurgency package to the legislature in November 1991, it did not address judicial reform. Nor did any other political party promote such reform. For its part, during 1990 and 1991 the United States provided less than \$1 million annually for the administration of justice in Peru.

### THE ROUTE TO THE AUTOGOLPE

In retrospect, the risk of a presidentially inflicted coup was evident soon after Fujimori's inauguration. His arrogance toward political leaders, including his own key advisers, his vitriolic slander of civilian institutions, and the keenness with which he eyed the military—especially promotions and dismissals—were all harbingers of his intentions. But, political analysts considered a coup unlikely because they assumed that the United States was informing President Fujimori that the international reaction to a coup would be extremely negative, and that this message had been duly received by Fujimori. In the event, however, if a clear message had been sent by the United States embassy, it certainly had been not heard in the presidential palace.

Although most analysts agreed with Fujimori's diagnosis that Peruvian democracy was seriously troubled, few thought that these problems could be cured by a Fujimori dictatorship. Rather, it was believed that Fujimori liked power—absolute power. Indeed, in Peru's popular newsmagazines, Fujimori had been satirized as a would-be Japanese emperor for months. In an interpretation echoed by most analysts, one senator who had worked closely with Fujimori commented that "Fujimori is... an authoritarian personality. I know for certain that he never had any liking, nor respect, nor desire to govern the country democratically. From the beginning he tried to create the conditions that would permit the concentration of power..."<sup>3</sup>

During his first 15 months, President Fujimori enjoyed tremendous policymaking power. While Peru's 1979 constitution concentrated great power in the executive, the two previous presidents under this constitution (AP's Fernando Belaúnde Terry, who served between 1980 and 1985, and APRA's Alan García Pérez, who held office between 1985 and 1990) were constrained at least somewhat by their political parties, whose members filled most cabinet offices and held near-majorities or majorities in the legislature. By contrast, members of Fujimori's *Cambio '90* wielded little power over the president. After his first

six months in office, almost all of Fujimori's cabinet members were political independents appointed by Fujimori himself and indebted directly to him, or to him as well as international actors, for their power.

Despite *Cambio '90*'s minority position in the legislature (holding slightly less than one-fourth the seats in each of the two legislative houses), Fujimori implemented policies without significant legislative obstruction. The president moved rapidly to re-insert Peru into the international financial community and liberalize the economy: state expenditures were slashed, state revenue increased, tariff barriers cut, and foreign investment laws eased. With respect to counterinsurgency, Fujimori emphasized the establishment of civilian self-defense patrols (*rondas*); while debated in the legislature, this policy was a major success, according to Fujimori himself. As part of the anti-drug effort, in May 1991 Fujimori signed a crucial agreement with the United States that was much more to the right than where Fujimori had stood on the issue during his campaign—but he did not submit the agreement to the legislature for approval. Fujimori's bypassing of the legislature was criticized, but no effort was launched to compel legislative review of the agreement.

Fujimori was able to govern autocratically despite his minority position in the legislature for various reasons. First, the parties were seriously weakened. Also, especially in the area of economic policy, Fujimori's free-market initiatives enjoyed considerable support in the legislature (about one-third of whose members had been in novelist Mario Vargas Llosa's pro-free-market coalition in the 1990 election). Also important were provisions in the 1979 constitution that allowed the executive to wield vast unilateral power over economic policy, and to issue decrees in any policy area if authority were delegated to it by the legislature. In previous administrations this authority was frequently delegated, especially at the start of the new presidency, and Fujimori too was given this political honeymoon.

However, as 1991 ended tensions between the executive and the legislature increased. In November, just as legislative power granted to Fujimori was about to expire, Fujimori issued an avalanche of some 126 decree laws—almost the same number as García had issued in his first three years—on a host of important issues, many of which he had not been given authority to legislate. In a special session two months later, the legislature modified or repealed 28 of these, most of which dealt with counterinsurgency. The decrees were draconian; one, for example, would have banned the publication of any information deemed secret by the government and imposed sentences of five to ten years in prison for offenders. The provisions prompted Peru's leading newsweeklies to run front-page images of Fujimori as Hitler and dressed half as a soldier and half as a civilian.

<sup>3</sup>Enrique Bernales, interviewed in *Ideele*, vol. 4, no. 37 (May 1992), p. 12. As a senator Bernales dealt extensively with Fujimori, but was not considered a vehement opponent of his.



The increasing acrimony between the executive and the legislature was apparent on other issues as well. Disagreement over the 1992 budget was intense. In particular, the legislature sought greater fiscal support for the agricultural sector, which it declared to be in an emergency. The Chamber of Deputies censured the minister of agriculture—the first time that a minister had been asked to resign under the 1979 constitution. Smugly pointing out that the constitution did not stipulate a timeframe for the minister's resignation, Fujimori kept him on. Fujimori threatened to dissolve congress and call new elections if his ministers were censured. Fujimori insulted legislators, and they responded by suggesting he might be impeached on grounds of moral incapacity.

Fujimori feared the future emergence of greater legislative opposition. After many months of legal battles against charges of illicit enrichment, former President García was finally exonerated by the supreme court (many of whose members were García appointees). Reelected secretary general of APRA, García hoped to unify and galvanize the political opposition to Fujimori, and presumably win the presidency again in 1995. Although it was unlikely that García could achieve these goals, Fujimori evidently did not want to risk the possibility.

Still, the political context was far from obstructionist. Consider, for example, that whereas the legislature under Fujimori censured one minister in 20 months, the legislature during Belaúnde's first term in the 1960s had censured more than 50. Although the legislature modified or repealed 22 percent of Fujimori's November decrees, it passed 78 percent of them. Overall, legislators wanted to negotiate with Fujimori—but Fujimori did not want to negotiate with them. As one key adviser to Fujimori told a journalist: "[Fujimori] could not stomach [the other] option, which would be to invite the chairman of the Senate along to the palace for a meal every time he wanted a law through congress."<sup>4</sup>

One event that may have hastened the coup was an accusation of corruption against members of Fujimori's family by the president's own wife, Susana. Mrs. Fujimori charged that used clothing donated by Japan for Peru's needy was being sold for profit by members of the president's family. After the coup Fujimori suspended the body that would have investigated his wife's charges. Was the leader who threw so many stones—the constant accusations that Peru's democracy was corrupt—living in a glass house?

## INTERNATIONAL AMBIVALENCE

On the evening of April 5, when President Fujimori announced his self-styled Government of Emergency and National Reconstruction and the military command indicated its support, United States Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America Bernard Aronson had just arrived in Lima, expecting to speak with Fujimori the next day. Astounded by the coup, Aronson canceled his meeting with the president and left Peru. The United States immediately suspended most nonhumanitarian aid to the country, as did Canada and Spain; most Latin American nations condemned the coup.

International hostility apparently persuaded Fujimori to soften his stand. The night of the coup, security forces had seized internationally respected opposition journalist Gustavo Gorriti as well as several APRA leaders, and had tried unsuccessfully to capture García. Military officials forced their way into the offices of most of Peru's main newspapers, newsmagazines, and television and radio stations. Within a few days, however, Fujimori ceased his most egregiously repressive actions.

At the same time, international opposition abated as Peruvian support for Fujimori's measures became clear. Apparently agreeing with Fujimori that the pre-April 5 regime was inefficient, frivolous, and corrupt (in part because Fujimori had been repeating these accusations for months), more than 75 percent of the people approved Fujimori's administration and his actions against the legislature and the judiciary. (At the same time, however, 75 percent expressed a preference for democracy rather than dictatorship, and more than 80 percent said municipal elections should be held as scheduled in 1992 and presidential elections as scheduled in 1995; apparently, Peruvians believed Fujimori's statements that his new regime would be transitional.) Aware that sanctions had failed to restore democracy in Haiti, and the complex issues posed by the facts that Fujimori had been elected, that he continued to enjoy popular support, and that Peru's democratic institutions had not been performing effectively, international diplomats hesitated to impose similar sanctions on Peru.

The key pending question was Peru's restoration into the good graces of the International Monetary Fund and the international banks. This goal was paramount for Fujimori, and the threat to suspend support for Peru's re-insertion was the primary lever wielded by international actors in their attempts to nudge Fujimori back toward democracy. However, the international community knew that Fujimori had cards to play as well; if re-insertion was denied, Fujimori could reverse free-market policies and terminate Peru's servicing of its debt arrears (payments of about \$750 million annually). Moreover, a possible beneficiary of

<sup>4</sup>"Political and Economic Trend Report," *The Peru Report*, vol. 6, no. 3 (May 1992), p. 3. Some analysts, including journalist Gustavo Gorriti and scholar-political leader Henry Pease García, believe that Fujimori actually provoked executive-legislative tensions in order to justify the coup.

increased problems for the Fujimori government, at least in the short run, was the Shining Path.

An additional factor important to increasing international toleration of Fujimori's coup was the friendship between Fujimori and the Japanese government. As the first Latin American president of Japanese origins, Fujimori was perceived by the Japanese as a spectacularly successful native son. After his inauguration, Fujimori traveled to Japan several times. The Japanese government donated about \$400 million to his government in 1992 and would have been reluctant to prevent Peru's readmission into the international financial community on political grounds.

An incident on April 24 at first appeared likely to further alienate the United States and Peru, but ultimately seemed to have little impact: a United States Air Force Hercules C-130 plane was downed by two Peruvian fighter jets; one American airman died. Peruvian authorities claimed that the plane was hundreds of miles off course from a routine counterdrug surveillance mission, and that its crew had failed to respond to repeated Peruvian warnings; Peru later sent the Pentagon a bill for its incurred costs.

From mid-April to mid-May, negotiations between key international actors and the Fujimori government were intense. Assistant Secretary of State Aronson returned to Peru to speak with Fujimori, and two OAS missions led by Uruguayan Foreign Minister Héctor Gros Espiell also met with him. In these meetings, Fujimori proposed a July 5 plebiscite on his rule, after which his cabinet would draft constitutional reforms; he rejected holding elections for a constituent assembly. International actors and the political opposition favored scheduling elections. Moreover, the opposition argued that, in its view, the 1979 constitution remained in effect; since Fujimori's actions had violated the constitution, the first vice president, former Cambio '90 leader Máximo San Román, was Peru's legal president. To advance their arguments, Peru's traditional parties and unions successfully organized a large rally in downtown Lima on May 15.

On May 18, at an OAS meeting in the Bahamas where foreign ministers were deciding further policy toward Peru, Fujimori surprisingly appeared. Speaking to the meeting, Fujimori promised elections for a constituent assembly within five months. Fujimori's shift towards the position of his international and domestic opposition was a crucial compromise. While after the OAS meeting the official attitude of the United States remained "wait-and-see," most Peruvian analysts (and apparently Fujimori himself) believed that the international spotlight would no longer be focused on Peru and that, unless the elections were entirely fraudulent, Peru's re-insertion into the international financial community would proceed. In the months that followed, as Fujimori delayed municipal elections and skewed electoral procedures to his advantage with

hardly a comment from the international community, the Peruvian view appeared to have been correct.

## THE COUP'S AFTERMATH

During the course of 1992, Fujimori managed to maintain several accomplishments that Peruvians had welcomed during his first 20 months. Paramount among these was the low rate of inflation, estimated at 55 percent for 1992 (in contrast to over 7,000 percent in 1990). The government also scored major blows against a secondary guerrilla group, the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, including the capture of its leader, Victor Polay Campos, in June.

Otherwise there were few apparent bright spots. Except for the relatively low inflation rate, the economy was faring poorly. As mentioned earlier, GDP declined during 1992, and the rate of decline was greater after April 5. An exchange rate undervaluing the United States dollar impeded the development of new export industries. Peru was spending about \$60 million to \$90 million per month to service its arrears on a roughly \$20-billion foreign debt, and new international resources were not being disbursed. President Fujimori continued to eschew the establishment of a social emergency program to cushion the blows of the "Fujishock" against the poor. Poverty levels remained among the worst in the region.

During June and July, the Shining Path escalated its attacks, especially in Lima. On June 5, a car bomb devastated television channel two, and on July 16 another car bomb exploded in one of Lima's well-to-do suburbs, killing 21 people, injuring 250, and damaging 6 hotels, 10 banks, 20 shops, and 400 homes. Nationwide, the guerrillas' July offensive included 293 attacks that left 179 persons dead. The Shining Path was perceived to be gaining, not losing, in the wake of the April 5 coup. When Guzmán was finally captured, he was preparing "Operation Conquer Lima."

While the Peruvian government won some battles in the "war against drugs," overall the war was still being won by the drug producers and traffickers. Some corrupt officials were removed, airstrips in drug-producing areas were controlled during daylight hours, and arrests and cocaine seizures in 1992 were slightly higher than in 1991. But the percentage of Peruvian territory planted in coca or other drugs and controlled by drug traffickers and/or guerrillas, continued to expand. Only one-half of 1 percent of Peru's raw cocaine is seized before its export to Colombia, and less than 1 percent of all drug flights to Colombia are intercepted. Under current conditions it is impossible to discern a path toward victory in the war against drugs in Peru.

Peruvians were gradually becoming skeptical that Fujimori's coup would improve their lives. Whereas roughly 75 percent of Peruvians approved the coup

just after the event, in May the number approving fell to 56 percent and by June the figure was 41 percent.

### THE CAPTURE OF GUZMÁN

On September 12, 1992, the Peruvian government scored its first major triumph against the Shining Path. At a minimum, the capture of Guzmán and other key leaders would require the organization to regroup and choose new chiefs, and thus provide the government important breathing space. Quite possibly the threat that had been posed to the Peruvian state by Sendero was over.

While Fujimori claimed credit for the capture, there was no objective basis for his claim. Indeed, Fujimori had suggested that the key to counterinsurgency would be a hard-line military approach. But it was the anti-terrorist police, not the military, that captured Guzmán. The elite DINCOTE unit, established under President García and led by General Antonio Vidal, had almost captured Guzmán twice before (once during the final months of the García administration).

DINCOTE's raid was admirably professional. Apparently having followed a Shining Path leader recently released from jail, the police found the Lima hideout. DINCOTE maintained surveillance of the house with undercover agents disguised as city employees, street peddlers, and guests at a backyard barbecue in a police officer's nearby home. A police couple, posing as smooching lovers, parked across the street from Guzmán's hideout. They spotted a woman stepping out of the house to buy Winston cigarettes, Guzmán's brand; when the door was reopened for her, 35 heavily armed agents burst in. "Bingo—we got him!" exclaimed a jubilant detective. "My turn to lose," Guzmán reportedly said.

The effectiveness of the DINCOTE operation contrasted with the apparent carelessness of Guzmán and his lieutenants, which gave the government a tremendous victory over Sendero. Most analysts believed that, if Guzmán had been captured dead (reportedly the mode preferred by the Peruvian military), or if he had been able to commit suicide, he would have retained his mythical aura and become a martyr to the movement. Alive and videotaped, however, Guzmán revealed himself a man—indeed, a paunchy middle-aged man with a ragged beard and thick glasses. Peruvians viewed the ideologue who was called "Puka Inti" ("Red Sun") and the "Fourth Sword of Communism" meekly zipping up his pants. The image of invincibility that Sendero had cultivated for 12 years was punctured.

Almost as important as the capture of Guzmán was the arrest of many other Sendero leaders and militants. In Guzmán's hideout police captured two other members of the top echelon of the Shining Path's central committee; presumably using information found in the house, police rounded up about 200 suspected Senderi-

stas within a few days, and within a few weeks more than 1,000. Approximately 80 computers and 200 diskettes were seized, facilitating the capture of more top leaders, both in Lima and in provincial cities. By the end of the year, about 12 of 19 central committee members were behind bars. The only member of Guzmán's innermost circle still at large was reportedly Oscar Ramírez Duran (Comrade Feliciano), who was believed to be in the mountains above Arequipa.

However, while the information from hideouts enabled a more selective pattern of arrests in some areas, the number of disappearances and extrajudicial executions was similar to the 1990 and 1991 totals. Moreover, Fujimori's criticism of human-rights groups became more vitriolic. The National Intelligence Service (SIN) compiled a list of alleged Shining Path sympathizers that included several respected human-rights activists whom virtually everyone outside of the Peruvian government believed to be innocent.

On October 7, in a military trial closed to the public, a hooded navy judge sentenced Guzmán to life imprisonment. Guzmán's lawyer complained that he was not able to call any defense witnesses and that he was allowed to meet only twice with his client, for a total of 20 minutes. Fujimori's legal innovations in the trials of suspected terrorists—anonymous judges, military trials, and life sentences—did not trouble most Peruvians when the suspect was Guzmán, but the application of the same procedures to individuals arrested for tenuous reasons in shantytowns or rural villages was worrisome.

Still, violence continued. In the first 100-odd days after the capture of Guzmán, the number of terrorist attacks resembled that in the previous 100-odd days, and the number of deaths was only about 25 percent less. Before the November 22 elections, Sendero bombs again rocked Lima, taking the lives of several civilians. Yet, Sendero's attempt at an armed strike a few days prior to the elections and its call for an electoral boycott were largely defied. A dramatically smaller number of Peruvians now considers the Shining Path an omniscient, omnipresent, invincible movement.

### THE ATTEMPTED COUNTER-COUP

Rumors of a counter-coup circulated for many of the days following April 5, and were especially intense after the escalation of Shining Path attacks in July and August. At this time, the army chief of staff, General José Valdivia, was so frequently mentioned as the key coup-plotter that he published full-page advertisements in Lima newspapers stating his loyalty to Fujimori.

Various motives for a counter-coup were apparent. First, especially among officers who feared that Fujimori's regime would isolate Peru internationally, there was a desire to return to constitutional government.



Second, neither officers nor soldiers saw as much improvement in their economic lot after the coup as they thought they had been promised.

Perhaps most important, however, was that large numbers of officers resented the flagrant politicization of promotions and the purges within the military. Whereas there had been some politicization of appointments and dismissals since 1980, it drastically increased under Fujimori. The president's national security adviser, Vladimiro Montesinos, was directly involved in virtually all promotions and dismissals. The fact that a man of Montesinos's background—he was a cashiered army intelligence captain who had provided legal defense to drug traffickers during the 1980s—was manipulating appointments at the apex of the military hierarchy was galling to many officers.

On November 13, retired General Jaime Salinas Sedó hoped to lead a group of about 100 officers in an attempt to overthrow Fujimori. Salinas, who had been at the top of his army class and had been forced into retirement for political reasons under Fujimori in July 1992, wanted to return Peru to constitutional government. Apparently, he timed the plot in an effort to preclude legitimization of the Fujimori government by the constituent assembly elections. However, Fujimori learned about Salinas's plan (which apparently was to enter the presidential palace unbeknownst to the president and seize him), and Fujimori escaped to the Japanese embassy before the conspirators arrived at the palace.

Fujimori subsequently charged that Salinas and his colleagues planned to assassinate him. These charges were denied by the coup-plotters. However, the government arrested about a dozen high-ranking military officers, and also accused numerous civilian leaders of complicity in the plot, spurring several to seek political asylum. The intense political questions raised by the coup attempt dominated many Peruvians' thoughts despite the fact that the constituent assembly elections were only about 10 days away.

## THE NOVEMBER 22 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS

President Fujimori hoped that the elections for the Democratic Constituent Congress (CCD) would legitimize his government and constrain the opposition much like the 1980 plebiscite on a new constitution did in General Augusto Pinochet's Chile. Moreover, he wanted as large a majority in the assembly as possible for his own political party, *Nueva Mayoría/Cambio '90* (New Majority/Change '90) in order to aid him in dominating the institution. To this end there were a number of electoral manipulations; yet, the elections gained the stamp of approval of a 210-member OAS delegation. Presumably, Fujimori feels assured that he will be able to manipulate future elections without international reverberations.

Upon Fujimori's return from speaking to the OAS meeting in the Bahamas and promising the constituent assembly elections, he was greeted with considerable skepticism by Peru's traditional parties. Not only had Fujimori already demonstrated his disdain for democratic institutions with his April 5 coup, but various steps before his OAS appearance had suggested that he would try to manipulate the elections. Shortly after the coup, Fujimori had dismissed the head of the National Elections Tribunal, and his replacement, César Polack, was considered spineless. Fujimori had also indicated that members of the constituent assembly would be ineligible to run for elective office for at least one term—a condition obviously deterring participation by leading figures of the traditional parties and thereby clearing the field for Fujimori.

As discussions between Fujimori and the opposition parties began, confidence was further eroded by several new announcements by the president. First, he postponed the constituent assembly elections for more than a month after the original deadline promised at the OAS meeting. The Fujimori government seemed to be delaying the establishment of specific guidelines for the elections. Most important for the opposition, Fujimori also postponed municipal elections (which according to the 1979 constitution were to be held in November 1992). The opposition believed that Fujimori wanted to delay these elections as long as possible so his political coalition could field a sufficient number of candidates for the 1,900-odd races at provincial and district levels.

Only in late July and August did the Fujimori government begin to establish the framework for the Democratic Constituent Congress. Fujimori announced that the congress would be a one-chamber body with 80 members elected nationally, whose term would last until July 28, 1995 (when, according to the 1979 constitution, Fujimori's presidency should end). The congress would write a new constitution, which would be submitted to a national referendum, and also pass laws and exercise oversight of the executive. By contrast, the political opposition contended that, after the assembly revised the constitution, new elections should be held for a legislature. The Fujimori government did not precisely stipulate the constituent assembly or legislative functions of the CCD, or how these functions would be meshed.

Fujimori's machinations presented a complex dilemma to the traditional political parties. If the parties participated, their decision would be interpreted as acceptance of the procedures, thus legitimizing the elections. On the other hand, if they did not participate and Fujimori achieved international approval for the elections, they would be politically marginalized. On top of this complex issue was the fact that opinion polls showed the major traditional political parties with minimal popular support.

While either participating in the elections or boycotting them appeared a rational decision for Peru's parties, the fact that some parties participated while others boycotted may have been the worst possible outcome for them. Divided on the election, the parties could not make a clear statement of opposition to the international community; nor could they achieve the higher electoral tallies that would have been likely if better-known opposition leaders had participated. The boycotting parties could not even agree on whether opponents to Fujimori should abstain (potentially subjecting themselves to a fine in the \$15 range), spoil their ballots, or vote for collegial parties.

The parties tended to hedge their bets: a better-known party would abstain, and a lesser-known stand-in or faction would participate. Accordingly, APRA abstained, but a faction, the Democratic Coordination ran; Belaúnde's AP abstained, while its erstwhile coalition partner, the PPC, participated; Mario Vargas Llosa's Liberty Movement abstained while the splinter group Renewal took part; the largest leftist group, the Mariáteguista Unified party, abstained but smaller leftist entities formed a new front, the Democratic Movement of the Left.

Perhaps the division among the political parties was one of Fujimori's goals. Often, he seemed to be trying to provoke political actors, or keep them off-balance for purposes only he knew. For example, on at least one occasion during the campaign, Fujimori stated that, if the assembly did not behave, he would boot it out again. (Hearing Fujimori's threats, former president Belaúnde dubbed the CCD "the Alka-Seltzer Congress" since Fujimori could dissolve it whenever he felt like it.) At the last minute, Fujimori proposed that a referendum on the introduction of the death penalty be held simultaneously with the constituent assembly elections; the proposal prompted a threat of withdrawal by the PPC and criticism by the Organization of American States, and Fujimori withdrew the initiative.

Fujimori's machinations continued during the campaign. His new political coalition, Nueva Mayoría/Cambio '90, distributed considerable benefits to potential voters, some from public funds. In a reversal of the traditional interpretation of electoral law, new parties and parties that had received less than 5 percent of the vote in the preceding election were required to collect 100,000 signatures in order to qualify to compete. Most of the parties that ultimately participated spent much of the pre-electoral period collecting these signatures. Delays by the National Elections

Tribunal in validating the signatures and recognizing parties meant that the actual campaign period was brief—only about two weeks. This was insufficient, given that most of the competing parties were unknown to the voters and had scant resources for media advertising (and that much of the news during this period turned out to focus upon the attempted counter-coup).<sup>5</sup>

Questions were also raised about voting-day conditions. In some observers' views, adequate numbers of voting-table officials were not fielded. Also, as "an alliance," rather than a party, Nueva Mayoría/Cambio '90 received a separate spot at the bottom of the ballot, standing out much more clearly than the other parties, which were clustered together.

The OAS did not loudly object to the Fujimori government's maneuvers. Perhaps influenced by officials in United States President George Bush's administration who favored Peru's return to international good graces, or by representatives of other Latin American nations who feared intensive international analysis of their own elections, or by top OAS leaders who believed a Fujimori government was Peru's best option, the OAS's focus was on the absence of fraud on election day.

Installed on December 30, 1992, the CCD's immediate mission is to revise the 1979 constitution. Presumably, the CCD will grant greater powers to the executive. Two possible revisions appeared especially controversial: introducing the death penalty for crimes of terrorism and allowing the immediate reelection of the president, which would enable Fujimori to run in 1995.

## PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY

By the end of 1992, having overcome a number of international and domestic obstacles, Fujimori appeared to be consolidating his power. However, especially given Fujimori's lack of an institutional base, his current support in the business and popular sectors could dissipate quickly if the Peruvian economy does not improve. Also, the more arrogant the Fujimori government acts toward its political enemies, the more likely that a strong domestic and international political opposition will be forged. With the inauguration of President Bill Clinton, the United States could decide not to support Peru's reentry into the international financial community—a decision that could doom Fujimori.

In any case, a new era began for Peru in 1992. It will be shaped by the widespread perception that democracy as fashioned in the 1979 constitution failed, and by the intense political polarization between Fujimori and political leaders of the 1980s. Given this, it will be harder than ever to build democracy in Peru. ■

<sup>5</sup>Nueva Mayoría/Cambio 90 is estimated to have outspent all but one other party (one of whose candidates was a media magnate who may not have spent funds for media time) by a factor of at least three to one. Altogether, 9 of the 18 competing parties spent only 12 percent of what Fujimori's group spent. *Caretas*, November 26, 1992, p. 13.

Despite two efforts by the armed forces in 1992 to overthrow President Carlos Andrés Pérez, "Venezuelans are more dissatisfied with Pérez and the political parties than with democracy. The populace... perceives no contradiction between general support for democracy and a conviction that an unpopular leader should be forced out of office, by persuasion or by force."

## Venezuela in Crisis

BY JUDITH EWELL

The pomp and circumstance of Carlos Andrés Pérez's second presidential inauguration on February 2, 1989, evoked comparisons with an imperial coronation. Incongruously, United States Vice President Dan Quayle, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega Saavedra, Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González, Cuban President Fidel Castro, and former United States President Jimmy Carter mingled in public tribute. Pérez in his first term as president of Venezuela, from 1974 to 1979, had used an unprecedented flow of oil revenues to launch ambitious construction projects, expand the state's influence in the economy, compensate foreign multinationals for the 1975 takeover of the oil and iron industries, finance an expansionist foreign policy, and provide jobs and social services for most of the population. Could "CAP," as he was popularly known, pull off another miracle by bringing the nation out of its economic tailspin and casting off the weight of the \$34-billion foreign debt?

Two weeks later Pérez the populist gave proof of his metamorphosis into Pérez the neoliberal. The Democratic Action (AD) leader dashed many Venezuelans' hopes with the brusque announcement of his first austerity measures. These included the immediate lifting of price controls on many basic consumer items and public services, the gradual elimination of import duties and preferential exchange rates, a freeze on public sector jobs, and a graduated rise in gasoline prices and urban transport fares; at some unspecified future date, according to the plan, there would be a compensating hike in salaries and the minimum wage. Pérez had moved quickly, with a minimum of discussion, to appease the International Monetary Fund and the country's foreign creditors since his predecessor, Jaime Lusinchi, had exhausted Venezuela's hard cur-

rency reserves and suspended payments on the foreign debt the previous December.

### THE EXPLOSION OF CARACAS

Triggered by Pérez's announcement and by speculation in food items and transport tickets on the part of merchants and bus drivers, the people of the Caracas barrios took to the streets on February 27, 1989, in a spontaneous protest that became known as the *caracazo*, or explosion of Caracas. Large-scale looting for food items, sometimes with the open tolerance of police officers whose salaries were a month in arrears, began in a relatively orderly manner. As the looters returned home, small bands of miscreants began an orgy of destruction and theft. Although events were out of hand by late the first night, Pérez inexplicably delayed sending in the army and National Guard until the end of the following day.

The barrio dwellers, frightened by the gangs, generally welcomed the armed forces, known familiarly as the "*soldaditos*" (little soldiers), who restored order. Journalists reported that people brought food to soldiers on guard or invited them into their apartments to wash or warm up. The troops' vulnerability and poor training, however, prompted nervous shooting, especially at night, that left too many dead.

The metropolitan police all but disappeared from the streets until the armed forces had the situation in hand. They then returned with the hated internal police and the military intelligence forces to search houses for stolen goods and to detain students and other alleged subversives. Random shootings continued, both by sharpshooters in buildings and by the military and police.

The riots and the response to them proved to be ominous portents for the Democratic Action government. Numerous politicians and more affluent citizens dismissed the barrios dwellers—the majority of the capital's 4 million inhabitants—as inferior, criminal, marginal, uncivilized. CAP himself remained unwilling to open a dialogue with the poor. Most of the other

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politicians and parties also abandoned the troublesome barrios. The riots demonstrated that no institutions existed to channel Venezuelans' discontent.

In this political vacuum the armed forces became the guarantors of order and normality. People commented that if Pérez had declared the state of emergency earlier, the army could have prevented the anarchistic aftermath to the early protests and looting. The two days of rioting and eight days of military occupation resulted in an official death toll of 277; unofficial observers estimated the toll at as high as 2,000. The discovery of unmarked mass graves the following October gave credibility to the unofficial reports of deaths. The specter of the riots, and their significance for Venezuelan democracy, haunted Pérez's second presidency.

### A NEOLIBERAL SUCCESS STORY

In spite of the sobering riots, Pérez held to his course of neoliberal economic reforms. By nearly any measure he had inherited an economic disaster from his two predecessors, and he applied his characteristic energy and stubbornness to implementing the necessary remedies. Between 1981 and 1989, Venezuela's per capita GDP had dropped 24.9 percent, a decline surpassed only by that of Bolivia in that "lost decade." Inflation reached a record 81 percent in 1989. Around the country, infrastructure and services crumbled. The private sector, both domestic and foreign, had pulled capital out of Venezuela and refused to reinvest until structural reforms were in place. Between 1984 and 1988 Venezuela spent \$25 billion on debt service—50 percent of its export earnings, and nearly equivalent to the entire public debt.

The breakthrough in negotiations on the debt came in August 1990 after Pérez began his program of privatizing industry, opening Venezuela's market to foreign imports, and eliminating domestic subsidies. Under the provisions of United States Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady's plan to ease third world debt payment burdens, Venezuela signed a renegotiation agreement reducing private bank debt by 20 percent and cutting annual service payments in half. The agreement inspired foreign banks to ante up \$1.1 billion in new loans. In September 1990 Venezuela further confirmed a commitment to free trade by joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Pérez took to privatization with a vengeance. He sold the national airline, Viasa, along with several banks, a telephone company, hotels, sugar mills, and a shipyard. Laws were changed to allow a majority foreign interest in most industries except oil and iron. Desperate to attract new investment capital, Venezuela offered incentives with debt equity conversion programs and removed restrictions on the transfer of dividends and profits abroad. The maximum corporate and personal tax rates were reduced from 50 percent to 30 percent (a

relatively moot point in a country in which few pay significant taxes). In 1991, on July 5—Venezuelan Independence Day—Pérez delighted Venezuela's business community by rescinding the domestic restrictions on economic activity that had been in effect since 1962. (Last year, however, CAP provoked popular consternation when he invited foreign oil companies to return.)

Encouraged by President George Bush's Enterprise for the Americas initiative and with a weather eye to the progress of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), in 1990 Pérez reduced tariffs drastically, eliminated most import licenses, and cut subsidies on exports. He joined other members of the Andean Pact in implementing common external tariffs and agreed to reduce tariffs in the Group of Three (Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela) by late 1992.

Venezuela remained, however, highly dependent on petroleum revenues and sensitive to international changes in the price of oil. The crisis in the Persian Gulf beginning in August 1990 provided a windfall in higher prices and increased revenues, followed by the predictable easing of prices in late 1991 and in 1992. Pérez scrambled last year to readjust his expenditures to avoid a deficit, and sharply cut budget allocations for 1993. He authorized the national petroleum company to embark on a long-term expansion and investment program aimed at a permanent increase in production.

By 1992 Venezuela had registered spectacular economic results. New capital had flooded in, inflation had dropped to around 30 percent, and the 9.2 percent growth in GDP for 1991 was the second highest in the Americas. Foreign reserves again rested at a comfortable \$13 billion, up from a low of \$300 million when Pérez took office. And unemployment had fallen from 10 percent to 8.8 percent.

But some troubling questions remained. Had the structural changes under Pérez brought about the improvement, or did Persian Gulf War revenues account for the more favorable picture? Nontraditional (that is, nonpetroleum) exports have grown, but these still represent only a modest proportion of foreign earnings, the lowest among newly industrializing Latin American countries. In 1991 the profits from real estate and financial services nearly equaled the profits from manufacturing—hardly a good sign for future exporting capacity. Much of the new investment coming in can go out just as quickly, especially in a period of unrest. Lower tariffs allowed United States goods to flood into Venezuela, and the historical pattern of nonrenewable petroleum resources funding massive imports repeated itself. Larger political questions also linger. Most Venezuelans acknowledge that they have squandered the postwar opportunity to "sow the petroleum" in a productive and expanding economy. Still, many wonder whether allowing foreigners to re-

take the economic initiative is compatible with the nationalistic values of their social democracy.

### IDEALISTIC FOREIGN POLICY— WITH A PURPOSE

Like his two predecessors in the presidency, Pérez found his foreign policy limited by the debt and general economic crisis. He retained his enthusiasm for foreign initiatives, however, and his frequent trips abroad and some aspects of his foreign policy caused trouble at home. He cooperated with President Bush during the gulf crisis and in the hemispheric campaign to halt the illegal drug trade. The United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) presence has been less visible in Venezuela than in countries like Peru and Colombia, but the agency did open an office in Maracaibo to supervise patrol of the Colombian border area, and Venezuelan military officers sometimes resent what they consider the DEA's high-handedness.

Pérez remained firmly in the tradition established by Rómulo Betancourt (founder of Democratic Action and president of Venezuela from 1959 to 1963) of supporting democratic governments and breaking relations with regimes based on force. For Pérez as for Betancourt, the idealistic principle was also meant to secure hemispheric allies for his own beleaguered government. Pérez urged Daniel Ortega to hold elections in Nicaragua; participated in arranging the UN-brokered peace accord in El Salvador; urged Castro to democratize in Cuba (while criticizing the United States for strengthening its blockade against the island); and tried without success to convince General Manuel Noriega to surrender power in Panama. Venezuela was the only country in the hemisphere to break relations with Peru after President Alberto Fujimori's *autogolpe* (self-instituted coup) last April. Pérez also actively supported the free election process in Haiti in 1990 and gave refuge and support to Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide after he was overthrown in September 1991. At the same time, the Venezuelan president criticized Aristide's aggressive alliance with the masses. "Direct democracy," CAP pronounced, "has not worked anywhere in the world."

Pérez seemed bored with the border issues that worried many Venezuelans. He took little note of the *garimpeiros*, or Brazilian gold miners, who ventured into Venezuela's Guayana region in the southern part of the country. The Jesuit monthly magazine SIC, along with other media, challenged the armed forces to fulfill their mission of maintaining the integrity of the country's borders. The lingering dispute with Colombia over territorial waters in the Gulf of Venezuela proved still volatile. In late 1991 Pérez angered the armed forces by promising to negotiate the boundary in the gulf, though Venezuelan officers had generally taken the position that Venezuela should not concede a centimeter. During the brief period last year when

Humberto Calderón Berti of the Social Christian party (COPEI) served as Venezuela's foreign minister, he fanned the flames by announcing that the entire gulf was Venezuela's; Calderón's statement played well at home, but aroused the ire of the Colombians and halted progress at the talks.

Pérez's average of 17 trips a year abroad angered many Venezuelans, who believed he was neglecting domestic problems. The National Congress, which must approve presidential requests to leave the country, humiliated Pérez when it refused him permission to travel to Madrid for the third world summit last summer.

### A MANDATE REVOKED

Pérez took office with one of the strongest mandates received by a Venezuelan president, having secured nearly 55 percent of the vote. By December 1992, four years later, the economy had chalked up its biggest gains in more than a decade, but Pérez enjoyed a scant 10 percent approval rating in the polls. People begged him to resign before the end of his term in February 1994. What had gone wrong? Were Venezuelans tired of democracy or just tired of Pérez?

The famed Pact of Punto Fijo, in which the major parties and sectors of society had agreed to support constitutional government and to which they had adhered since the fall of dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez in 1958, had weakened beyond recognition. Divisions in Democratic Action and COPEI, hardened by the economic and social crisis and by personal animosities, limited willingness to cooperate across party lines. Pérez had won his nomination over the opposition of AD party elders, many of whom characterized him as a self-aggrandizing, corrupt demagogue. COPEI had suffered bitter internal tensions when it had nominated Eduardo Fernández as its standard bearer in 1988, denying party founder Rafael Caldera's ambitions to run again. Seventy-six years old last year, the highly respected Caldera was determined to replay the conflict and wrest the nomination from Fernández, and to run in the presidential election scheduled for December 1993. Copeyanos gained nothing by allying themselves with Pérez, and could endanger the fortunes of their faction in the party if they made such a move. The most significant leftist party, the Movement for Socialism, continued its two-decade search for either a winning formula or a successful coalition; its members seemed ready to cast in their lot with Caldera, and joined the attacks on Pérez.

Far from supporting the system, leaders in both parties in 1992 urged the president to bow out, thus implicitly teasing the armed forces to remove him. In August Caldera spearheaded a movement in Congress to force Pérez's resignation a year before the end of his term. The maneuvers intensified as potential presidential candidates jockeyed for position.

Gubernatorial and local elections in 1989 and 1992 confirmed AD's slippage in popularity. Reformers had argued that direct, uninominal elections (rather than a choice among party slates) at the local level would reinvigorate the democratic spirit. Still, abstention rates were high (over 50 percent in 1989, somewhat less in 1992) even though voting was compulsory. Last December one of AD's possible *presidenciables*, Mayor Claudio Fermín of Caracas, lost his post to La Causa R's Aristóbulo Isturiz, a 44-year-old black high school teacher. The leftist Causa R had no national organization, having grown from a steelworkers union in Ciudad Guayana, where it had previously elected a governor of Bolívar state. The party promised to follow up its victory in Caracas with a national campaign in the presidential election.

Popular criticism of the major parties' stranglehold on the electoral and patronage system dated from the early 1980s. The Presidential Committee to Reform the State, created by decree in December 1984, offered numerous proposals for uninominal voting and other measures to make representatives responsible to the voters rather than the party elders who prepared candidate lists. Some of the more innocuous of the proposals made their way to Congress in 1992 as a preliminary to a popular referendum this year on a major rewriting of the 1961 constitution. Since Venezuela's major parties refuse to relinquish control, most of the reforms are window dressing.

Scandals have also sapped the political system's credibility. At the end of his first term as president, Pérez himself only narrowly escaped indictment for discrepancies in the books for the refurbishing of a refrigerated ship, the *Sierra Nevada*. More recently, he could not account for a \$17-million shortfall in his personal security fund, and was rumored to be spending millions on a presidential museum and library in his birthplace, the village of Rubio. Pérez's longtime mistress, Cecelia Matos, came under scrutiny for corruption during Pérez's previous administration and is popularly believed to have facilitated a fraudulent arms deal during the present one.

The previous Democratic Action president, Jaime Lusinchi, and his former mistress—now his wife—Blanca Ibáñez, are also under investigation, and she, unpopular because of the power she wielded during Lusinchi's tenure, has sought refuge in Costa Rica from indictment and extradition. Among other irregularities, under Lusinchi the Recadi (Office of Differential Exchange Control) administered preferential exchange rates for the importation of priority items; before Pérez abolished the agency in March 1989, it had doled out \$32 billion at below-market rates, enough to fund two-thirds of all Venezuelan imports over the period. Some merchants used the system to import the ever essential Johnny Walker scotch whiskey, while others found ways to send dollars at the preferential rates

offshore into foreign banks. Characteristically, no indictments or prison terms followed the newspaper headlines.

Much popular criticism, in fact, centers on the politicized judicial system and the ease with which the wealthy and well connected escape punishment in Venezuela. Common criminals and vagrants, on the other hand, can spend years in jail awaiting trial: only 28 percent of the 30,000 prisoners in Venezuelan jails have been convicted of any crime.

A number of prominent intellectuals and well-known figures, termed "the notables," led the public attacks on the government. Eighty-three-year-old novelist Arturo Usler Pietri and others from the intellectual sphere called for a protest march for public morality in the capital in June 1989. Among others, former presidential candidates Miguel Angel Burelli and José Vicente Rangel—both political independents—frequently gave interviews in which they criticized Pérez and the ambient corruption and warned that a military coup was imminent. On a television program broadcast in August 1989, Rangel noted, "Venezuelans have always supported democracy, but now democracy is being associated with evils committed by political parties and politicians." In spite of the notables' high visibility, however, the Jesuit magazine *SIC* considered them irrelevant, stating in its September–October 1990 issue, "Our notables, like our parties, are so removed from popular problems that very few people pay any attention to them."

## THE TWO COUPS OF 1992

The popular riots of February 1989 were unexpected and frightening, but the two efforts last year by an armed forces to overthrow Pérez were even more chilling. The military had not seriously threatened an elected government since 1962. President Betancourt reorganized the armed forces to encourage rivalry among the services and minimize their negotiating power. He replaced the general staff of the armed forces with a weaker joint staff that was advisory only. Soldiers on active duty may not vote, though all the political parties actively cultivate allies in the military, thus creating another source of division.

The duplication inherent in such an organization, coupled with the mission to defeat guerrillas in the 1960s, made for lavish defense expenditures. Defense spending currently consumes a relatively small portion of GDP (3.07 percent), but this represents \$79 for every Venezuelan, the highest per capita in Latin America.

Until February 27, 1992, the general prosperity in Venezuela, interservice rivalry, and officers' commitment to the democratic system had forestalled any serious attempts at a coup. On that day, however, about 10 percent of the armed forces, led by an army paratrooper regiment, took part in a plot to kidnap and



assassinate President Pérez on his return from a junket to Switzerland. But glitches in the planning and the fact that the great majority of soldiers remained loyal foiled the coup.

The conspirators, led by 37-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez Frías, styled themselves the Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement, and their manifestos invoked the names of South American liberator Simón Bolívar, his enlightened teacher Simón Rodríguez, and 1850s guerrilla leader Ezequiel Zamora, whose war cry was "Death to the whites and those who can read." Chávez and many of the other junior officers involved were members of the military academy class of 1976. The *golpistas* cited as reasons for their action the wave of corruption in the country, the public disorder created by strikes and demonstrations, the privatization of what they considered parts of the "*patria*" (fatherland), Pérez's softness on the dispute with Colombia over territorial waters, and inadequate military benefits. As ardent nationalists, many also questioned the role they were forced to play in the United States-sponsored war on drug trafficking and in maintaining civil order.

Even under relatively large military budgets the living standards of enlisted troops, noncommissioned officers, and junior officers had declined during the economic crisis. Access to housing, health care, and education for dependent children, especially in remote areas, had become a problem. In late 1991 Congress had nearly halved a Defense Ministry proposal for a social security and welfare plan for military personnel. Many of the rank and file complained that their modest living standards and their sometimes defective equipment contrasted sharply with the opportunity for illicit enrichment that higher ranking officers enjoyed. (In mid-1991, for example, General Herminio Fuenmayor, the director of military intelligence, had been dismissed for presumed involvement in a cocaine ring.)

In the wake of the February coup attempt, retired General Jacobo E. Yepes Daza published in the Caracas press a letter from 63 high-ranking retired officers asserting that if the people in general were dissatisfied, it was small wonder that soldiers—the "people in arms"—were too. In other writings Yepes Daza had advocated military realism, which to him meant a thorough grounding in Venezuelan conditions and traditions rather than foreign military training and the application of foreign models. For instance, a Venezuelan officer needed field experience to know that his soldiers preferred *arepas con queso* (corn bread with cheese) to imported K rations and to realize that the Venezuelan army's mission in national development might differ from that of the United States army. Yepes approved a mid-1970s Venezuelan army directive, later dropped, mandating that officers complete the general staff course with high marks before being granted permission to study abroad.

Last May some in the Army War College expressed concern about "a dangerous ideological penetration by and dependence on the United States." That same month Defense Minister Fernando Ochoa Antich objected to United States interference in Venezuelan affairs, with particular reference to the DEA's instructions to the Venezuelan National Guard on the use of United States helicopters on loan for drug interdiction in Zulia state. Venezuela returned the aircraft. "In Venezuela," asserted Ochoa, "neither the government nor the armed forces receive instructions from the United States State Department."

The February *golpistas* called for support from students, workers, intellectuals, and the progressive wing of the Roman Catholic Church. Surprisingly, the public responded sympathetically to the officers, making Chávez a national hero. In July pollsters asked 330 people (91 percent of them eligible voters) to rank Chávez against possible presidential contenders for 1993, and the failed coup leader came in ahead of COPEI's Caldera and Claudio Fermín and Luis Piñerua Ordaz of the AD. Ironically, Chávez's popularity did not necessarily translate into a preference for a military government. When asked on November 17 if they preferred a military government or a democracy, 97 percent of respondents chose democracy. Less than 10 percent of those polled, however, approved of President Pérez.

CAP, shaken by the attempted coup, made some efforts to address both civilian and military complaints. For the armed forces, he raised salaries by 40 percent, enhanced social security benefits, and promised subsidized housing loans. To defuse the popular demonstrations on behalf of the rebels, he released all but 47 of the conspirators arrested in February. Pérez also tried to shore up his shrinking popularity by slowing down or canceling austerity measures affecting the price of medicines and a number of basic food items, and he abandoned the graduated increases in gasoline prices.

The president brought several COPEI members and independents into the government and promised to expedite constitutional reform, but the bid to revive the old bipartisan pact quickly collapsed. Both the Movement for Socialism and COPEI insisted that the constitutional reform referendum should include a provision requiring CAP to resign before the end of his term. His own party only grudgingly gave Pérez the support necessary to defeat the measure in Congress. In June COPEI pulled out of the coalition government. As civilian ministers withdrew, Pérez replaced some of them with military men. His defense minister, Fernando Ochoa Antich, had been loyal, but he was slated for mandatory retirement after 30 years of service. Pérez took the unprecedented step of switching Ochoa to the Foreign Ministry after his retirement, and called several other military officers to sub-cabinet positions.

Still the popular demonstrations continued. Between the February coup attempt and early June, there were 451 demonstrations against Pérez, 199 of them violent. On March 10 more than 2 million residents of Caracas banged on pots and pans, flicked lights on and off, and exploded fireworks. The protest focused on CAP but expressed a general rejection of corruption, poor public services, personal insecurity, the slowness of reform, and declining living standards. Like the February 1989 riots, this manifestation was not staged by any political party. From midyear, however, Pérez began charging that "subversives" were prompting the protests. He cited in particular the Tercer Camino (Third Way) of former guerrilla Douglas Bravo and the Maoist Bandera Roja (Red Flag), and arrested some of their leaders. Through censorship and presidential bluster the government tried to intimidate journalists and writers who spoke up against it.

CAP's popularity continued to fall along with oil revenues. Late last year the president presented his 1993 budget, which incorporated cuts in many areas, including a 20 percent reduction in defense spending. Public order declined further. A group calling itself the Bolivarian Forces of Liberation announced it had a hit list of 127 corrupt Venezuelans who had eluded justice, including former President Lusinchi, Blanca Ibáñez, and labor leader Antonio Ríos. In September the group took credit for an unsuccessful assassination attempt against Ríos and a grenade attack on Ibáñez's house, although she was not home. At the other extreme, Cobra Negra (Black Cobra) '92 threatened to assassinate relatives of politicians and military men who criticized CAP (the name was the same as that of a group that had hunted down urban guerrillas in the 1960s, when Pérez was minister of the interior). Pérez's opponents accused him of hiring foreign mercenaries, principally Cubans and Nicaraguans, for a special security guard. An August poll found Venezuelans, not unreasonably, deeply concerned about personal security and violent crime.

The piranhas continued to circle. In April Chávez asserted from prison that no civilians had been involved in the February coup attempt, but said he had planned to establish an interim junta, including the novelist Uslar Pietri, to rule until elections could be held. In June Uslar Pietri predicted that either a coup or anarchy would result if Pérez did not resign. The business association FEDECAMARAS followed up by complaining that CAP had neither cleaned up corrup-

tion nor established a true market economy. Congress continued to debate Caldera's demand that Pérez step down.

Perhaps only the date of a second military effort to overthrow Pérez remained uncertain. This second attempt finally took place on November 27, 1992. Although Pérez again escaped, this effort attracted the participation of a large portion of the air force and some high-ranking officers. Ninety-two of the officers fled to Iquitos, Peru, to request asylum, but half returned in December after Pérez promised clemency for those who had merely followed orders. Pérez charged that leftist extremists had joined the military conspirators for this attack, and moved to arrest some of his usual suspects. One of the conspirators, Rear Admiral Hernán Gruber Odreman, replied that the more senior officers had fought leftist guerrillas in the 1960s and had no intention of collaborating with them now. The problem, said the admiral, was that Pérez had refused to respond to a secret letter outlining military concerns—and this, Gruber concluded, was foolhardy of the commander in chief.

### CAN DEMOCRACY SURVIVE?

Cautiously, one might conclude that Venezuelans are more dissatisfied with Pérez and the political parties than with democracy. The populace, like the notables, perceives no contradiction between general support for democracy and a conviction that an unpopular leader should be forced out of office, by persuasion or by force.

An unhappy coincidence of circumstances—Pérez's combativeness and distance from the people, the generational and personal divisions in the major parties, the frustration of the majority of Venezuelans who have experienced a drastic drop in their standard of living and their expectations—has created a situation easily exploited by politicians, notables, and military officers.

The survival of Pérez's government, if not of the democratic system, may depend most in the near future on the armed forces. They will need tremendous restraint to ignore all the veiled and open invitations to remove Pérez. This presidential election year of 1993 is likely to prove a highly troubled one. One can only hope for the emergence of new political leaders who can open an authentic dialogue with the people. Hope for the future and effective political participation constitute the best defenses of democracy. ■

Fernando Collor de Mello, the most telegenic president in Brazil's history, resigned from office after the start of his impeachment trial—proof, Carlos da Silva says, of the vitality of democracy in the country.

## Brazil's Struggle with Democracy

BY CARLOS EDUARDO LINS DA SILVA

On December 29, 1992, Fernando Collor de Mello resigned as president of Brazil, 22 minutes after the Senate began his impeachment trial. Collor hoped by his action to avoid the prohibition from holding office for the next eight years that a conviction would have resulted in, along with his forced removal from the presidency. Brazil thus missed the opportunity to become the first country in history to remove a president from office through a peaceful impeachment process. However, by a vote of 73 to 8, the senators decided to continue the trial even after the resignation, and stripped Collor of his political rights until the year 2001.

### THE TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS OF DEMOCRACY

Collor was Brazil's first directly elected president in 29 years. His election on December 18, 1989, was regarded as the culmination of the redemocratization of the largest country in Latin America, a process that had begun in 1964 and led in 1985 to the electoral college choosing Tancredo Neves, a civilian, for the presidency. (Neves underwent surgery on the eve of his inauguration and was never able to take office; he was replaced by the vice president, José Sarney.)

Collor's failure was interpreted by some Brazilians as the failure of democracy. After all, the previous directly elected president—Jânio Quadros, chosen by absolute majority in 1960—also resigned, throwing the country into political disarray that eventually led to a military coup in 1964. In a society used to having democracy interrupted by military interventions (as happened not only in 1964 but also in 1889, 1930, 1945, and 1954)—to the point where some believed that conceding to the armed forces the role of political “moderator” was a sensible course, and where the most popular public figure, the soccer star Pelé, was quoted as affirming that “the people do not know how

to vote”—it would not be surprising if Collor's mismanagement of his presidential duties enhanced the prestige of totalitarians who believe the “order and progress” of the motto inscribed on Brazil's flag can be achieved only under what they euphemistically call a “strong government.”

There were amazing similarities between Quadros and Collor. Both were young when elected president (the former was 43, the latter 40); had meteoric political careers as, respectively, mayor of São Paulo and governor of Alagoas state; had no links to political parties but shifted from one to another according to their immediate needs; were charismatic, but known for their tempers and for having problems dealing with people; and were conservative yet populist.

When Quadros resigned seven months after being inaugurated, however, it was the beginning of a long hiatus in democracy in Brazil; with Collor's near-impeachment, it was just the opposite. Most Brazilians and outside observers saw the workings of the impeachment process as a sign of the renewed strength of democratic values in Brazilian society. They were also seen as a healthy indicator of growing intolerance to corruption in public officials. Collor was charged with receiving \$6.5 million in bribes solicited by his friends and supporters in exchange for government favors. Although he maintains he knew nothing of the scheme, investigators uncovered more than 40,000 kickback checks made out to bank accounts controlled either by Collor or his closest associates. Nor did his playboy lifestyle jibe with the \$33,000 a year he earned as president, even taking into account that he comes from a wealthy family. But if Collor is innocent, there is no doubt that most of his countrymen believe him to be guilty. Thousands demonstrated in the streets for his removal for more than a month before September 29, when the Chamber of Deputies, in a 441–38 vote, decided to relieve him of his powers for a maximum of 180 days while awaiting the impeachment trial in the other house of the National Congress. This is far different from the apathy or complacency with which Brazilians formerly regarded politicians accused of enriching themselves at taxpayers' expense. (To one of

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these, Adhemar de Barros, a popular three-time governor of São Paulo state, Brazil's richest and most developed, is attributed the statement: "I'm an embezzler, but I'm also an accomplicher.")

Despite the differing interpretations that can be placed on the episode, there are some basic facts that have to be understood as proof of the vitality of Brazilian democratic institutions. First, the military, for the first time, at least in the history of republican government in the country, was not considered the solution to a political crisis and did not seem interested in playing a part. Second, the charges against Collor were initially produced by newspapers and magazines, but the government never took any measures to restrain the freedom of the press, except when President Collor himself sued Otavio Frias Filho, editor-in-chief of Brazil's largest daily newspaper, *Folha de São Paulo*, because of stories denouncing favors in the distribution of paid federal government advertisements to the media. Collor lost in court, a decision that means the same thing for freedom of the press in Brazil that the Supreme Court decision in the Pentagon Papers case meant in the United States. Third, Congress—generally viewed as a bunch of thieves—chose this time to be more receptive to public opinion than to the offerings of favors from the executive branch. Fourth, the judiciary was extremely independent in carrying out its duties. Fifth, the political parties, usually undisciplined, demonstrated internal coherence and acted responsibly.

But Collor's fall was not all good news for democracy in Brazil. It caused new delays in the political stability necessary to establish economic reform. The country has been living with uncertainty for at least eight years. The end of the military regime in 1985 was followed by almost four years of virtual political stagnation during the drafting of a new constitution that was eventually adopted in 1988, a year before the presidential election of 1989—reason enough for another stretch of expectation and inaction. Collor's fall also means a possible reversal of economic policies that may hurt the country's ability to attract foreign investment. Social inequities in Brazil are enormous, and it is almost impossible to assure democratic institutions if they are not narrowed quickly.

Although elected vice president on the ticket with Collor, current President Itamar Franco is critical of many of his predecessor's policies—among them privatization, the opening of the Brazilian market to foreign competition, and the priority of fighting inflation over promoting growth—and may reverse them. It is unlikely that Franco will follow Collor's economic modernization program, which is similar to those recently adopted by Mexico and Argentina.

And although there was enormous popular interest in the Collor case and participation by huge crowds in the months before the Chamber of Deputies' impeach-

ment trial vote, the aftermath shows that Brazilians resent the frustrations that have been accumulating since the 1984 movement for direct elections. Despite the fact that it was the largest mass campaign in Brazilian history, with several demonstrations attended by more than 1 million citizens, Congress in 1984 failed to approve an amendment that would have established direct balloting for president. Nevertheless, the popular pressure for change was enough to assure the election of Tancredo Neves, a civilian who mildly opposed the military regime, as successor to the last general-president, João Figueiredo, by a Congress dominated by political allies of the military. But in order to win a majority in Congress, Neves chose as his running mate a supporter of the military, José Sarney. The hopes vested in Neves were frustrated by the unexpected illness that kept him from becoming president, and were subsequently transferred to the new constitution, regarded by many as a political panacea. Of course, the adoption of the constitution did not occasion any miraculous solution to the structural problems that hindered Brazil's development.

### A MEDIA CREATION?

Collor became the new object of millions of Brazilians' hopes for change. In his campaign for president he portrayed himself as an outsider who would fight against corruption and privilege, despite the fact that his maternal grandfather, Lindolfo Collor, was one of the most powerful members of President Getúlio Vargas's first cabinet in the 1930s; that his father, Arnon de Mello, was an influential congressman and senator in the 1950s and 1960s who, through his links with the military regime, launched his son's political career; and that he himself had been in politics since 1979, when he was appointed by the military to become mayor of the capital of the state of Alagoas. (To be completely fair, Collor was a little-known politician at the time he ran for president, and Alagoas—where his father hailed from, although Collor himself was born in Rio de Janeiro and grew up in Brasília—is a tiny and poor state.)

The Collor family owns the Alagoas television station, affiliated with the powerful Globo national network. The young Collor began appearing on the station often, receiving favorable coverage. The future president first gained national media attention because of the actions he seemed to be taking against public servants who were paid high salaries for no work—people he termed "maharajahs." It was eventually discovered, however, that Collor was no "maharajah hunter," as he styled himself, but that the whole thing was merely a public relations show. In the election year of 1989 Collor took advantage of a Brazilian law that obliges all television stations to give one hour a year of prime time to all political parties; he arranged to take over three small parties, and appeared three times in

less than four months on every television station around the country. Television is by far the most pervasive mass medium in Brazil, and Collor is the most telegenic politician in the country's history.

Collor's campaign appealed to the poorest Brazilians and those least interested in politics. It also received the support of the entire business community, which feared a victory by either Luis Inacio "Lula" da Silva, a metalworker who founded and leads the leftist Labor party, or Leonel Brizola, a populist who began his career affiliated with former Presidents Vargas and João Goulart.

Collor finished first in the opening round of the election, held November 15, 1989, but was not able to capture an outright majority. A runoff was scheduled between him and Lula da Silva. Collor centered his campaign around attacks against corruption in government and emphasized the dangers that the election of his opponent would supposedly carry. He employed all kinds of dirty tricks in his political advertisements, including a paid message from a former mistress of da Silva in which she accused him of trying to convince her to abort a child of theirs. When it was all over, Collor had won 52 percent of the vote and da Silva 48 percent—a surprisingly high percentage for the latter, who had spent much less on his campaign.

So with the backing of the vast majority of the population—including many who had voted against him but believed he had the electoral legitimacy to carry out his programs—Collor was inaugurated. His support was so high that even radical measures such as the freezing of all savings and checking accounts on March 16, 1990, received the approval of most Brazilian people.

## A CYNICAL AFTERMATH

Resentment caused by Collor's possible impeachment, after the high hopes that citizens had for his presidency and the trust they had placed in him, showed up in several polls, revealing a cynicism about public institutions that causes disbelief in the democratic process and had in the past been used to justify military intervention. For instance, DataFolha released a poll on December 30 in which only 16 percent of respondents said they believed Collor or his associates would someday receive jail terms for actions that the respondents considered crimes. This skepticism was reinforced when Paulo César Farias, Collor's campaign treasurer, a close friend of the president and coordinator of the scheme unveiled by the impeachment process, was allowed by the supreme court to leave the country and fly to Spain before his trial started. Although Farias had been unemployed since May, he managed to travel in a private jet and to stay in the most expensive hotel in Barcelona, at a cost of \$940 a day for his and his family's suites. Farias tried to justify the trip by saying he had health problems—he snored at night, he explained.

Another sign of public disillusionment with the democratic process was the November 15 victory of Paulo Maluf—known during the military regime as the most extreme example of corruption in power, and the political heir of Adhemar de Barros—in the election for mayor of São Paulo over Eduardo Suplicy, one of the politicians most respected in Brazil for his ethical behavior.

There will be a political impasse in Brazil at least until April 21, when a referendum will be held on the form of government the country should adopt. The electorate will have to decide whether the monarchy should be restored and whether or not it prefers a parliamentary form of government over the current presidential system. This is another issue that will consume the time and energy of political leaders when they should be dealing with urgently needed structural reform.

It is generally assumed that the Collor affair will improve the chances of a victory for the parliamentary form of government, although parliamentarism requires a few strong political parties and Brazilian parties are young, weak, and numerous. The reasoning here is that an episode like the one involving Collor would not have been so traumatic if Brazil had a parliamentary system, since Collor would have been removed from office by a simple vote in Congress. The kind of parliamentarism that would be implemented in Brazil in case of the expected win next month remains in doubt. If parliamentarism is victorious there will be another in-between period, since the change would only become effective after President Franco finishes serving out Collor's term; however, Franco, a supporter of the new system, says he intends to create an informal parliamentarism for the remainder of his short administration if a parliamentary system is chosen by a majority of voters.

This year the 1988 constitution must also be revised because of a provision contained in it. This again will demand prolonged debate and may give rise to political compromises and bargains that will delay structural reforms still further. Among the possible changes in the constitution, a revision of the role of vice president is not foreseen (assuming that the current presidential form of government is maintained), although the vice presidency has been a cause of instability. The president and his vice president have seldom agreed on anything, and whenever the latter has stepped into the presidency fundamental policy changes have occurred. This was the case, for instance, in 1961 when Quadros resigned and was replaced by Goulart, who was deposed by the armed forces in 1964 after a brief and troubled period of parliamentarism (imposed as a condition for Goulart's taking over the presidency and voted down in a referendum in 1962).

Evaluating the prospects for democracy in Brazil by examining Collor's rise and fall may lead to the wrong

conclusions. In general it seems reasonable to say that chances for a stable, democratic political system were improved by recent events. But, for example, most of the people who took to the streets in August were high school students who painted their faces to announce their disgust with Collor. Many analysts saw the revival of the student movement as evidence of the high degree of political consciousness among Brazilian youth. It may be so. It may also be the case that it was fashionable for youngsters to take part in these demonstrations.

Unlike the celebrations that swept the country when the Chamber of Deputies voted to suspend Collor in September, the resignation in December received little reaction, and news of Collor's definite departure from power was overshadowed by a bizarre police story involving two extremely famous young soap opera stars (Daniela Perez, 22, was stabbed to death by Guilherme de Pádua, 23, with whom she had a love affair both onscreen and in real life). The impetus for political activity driven by moral concerns seemed to have cooled off after only a few months. The same Chamber of Deputies that showed so much courage in September was ready to choose a speaker with a curriculum vitae that could not be described as enviable in the ethics department. Collective morale in Brazil was low at the beginning of December, despite the recent

victory against Collor: according to a poll conducted by Ibope, 65 percent of Brazilians think their countrymen as a group are dishonest.

Most alarming, Brazilian elites have once again shown how capable they are of solving political crises in a creative and peaceful manner but also how unwilling to promote change in inequitable social structures. This is a tradition in Brazil, and a sign of the deftness of past rulers. Independence from Portugal was obtained in 1822 without a war, the heir to the Portuguese throne becoming the emperor of an independent Brazil; the monarchy was abolished by a coup led by one of Brazil's most prominent army commanders, who became the first president; more recently, the military regime was overthrown in a peaceful and intricate political maneuver that assured the transition to civilian government without any of the trauma experienced by other democratizing Latin American countries. But in none of these instances has there been a true commitment to reforms to promote prosperity for most of the population or to shake the well-established interests of powerful small groups. If Brazilian rulers do not tackle the challenge with determination and skill soon, the prospects for democracy, despite the recent formal victories, will not be as bright as they seem now. ■



"Aylwin's government has presided over a period of national unity not seen before by even the most senior generation of Chile's political leadership...[and] for which the president himself ought to get much of the credit.... Still, the right's opposition to [certain] reforms... keeps the current system in Chile from being a full-fledged democracy."

## Chile: South America's Success Story?

BY FELIPE AGÜERO

After almost three years in power, the coalition of parties supporting President Patricio Aylwin has every reason to be optimistic about the future. In a country increasingly swept by pre-election tides, few doubt that this coalition will win the balloting for president and the National Congress scheduled for December—the second such elections since the end of military rule under General Augusto Pinochet in 1990. Against the difficulties posed by the institutional legacies of authoritarianism, and by a watchful military, strong rightist opposition parties, and the accumulated social and economic grievances of a large portion of the population, the governing coalition of Christian Democrats, Socialists, and Radicals nonetheless has made substantial progress toward the goals it originally set.

Pursuing a strategy of reaching agreements with leaders of opposition parties and social organizations, and maintaining the basic features of the economic policies inherited from Pinochet appointees, Aylwin's government has presided over a period of national unity not seen before by even the most senior generation of Chile's political leadership. This infusing of almost all sectors of society with a sense of a common purpose—in stark contrast with the preceding two decades of harsh repression and the sharp political polarization that prevailed before that—will likely be this government's most valued contribution, and one for which the president himself ought to get much of the credit. The public has in fact rewarded the president with consistently high approval ratings.

During these past three years the military has for the most part been appeased, the generals having tempered their fears of retaliation from parties that were formerly their suppressed opposition, and Pinochet himself quite restrained. Business leaders take satisfaction from an unusually intense and constructive inter-

action with formerly distrusted Christian Democrats and Socialists. And voters, in the municipal elections of June 1992, seem to have accorded legitimacy to policies of moderation by simultaneously ratifying the commanding lead of the governing coalition and renewing strong support for the opposition. "Chile: Nicely Normal" was thus an appropriate title for an article in the December 26, 1992, *Economist* on politics in the country.

This state of affairs, however, has not been arrived at without occasionally ugly resurfacings of human rights grievances from the recent past and sporadic surges in government-military tensions, also often related to human rights. And underneath the complaisant surface of society lurks discontent over the inequities that were worsened by Chile's protracted economic structural adjustment, which has manifested itself in several places, including recently, among health care workers.

Nor does normality in Chile encompass the institutional reforms the government had planned to complete as part of the transition to democracy. Confronted with the persistent refusal of rightist parties to approve these reforms in Congress, the administration now maintains that the transition is nonetheless complete, as democratic governance is possible without them. Still, the right's opposition to the reforms—which concern the president's powers over military appointments, the composition of the National Security Council and the Constitutional Court, electoral law, and other aspects of the constitution—keeps the current system in Chile from being a full-fledged democracy.

### THE ECONOMY: ADJUSTED FOR SUCCESS

The Aylwin administration's ability to maintain high levels of support and build consensus has rested largely on successful management of the economy. With policies based on market mechanisms and continuous promotion of liberalization, privatization, business confidence, foreign investment, and export growth, the economy has expanded at an impressive pace for the past two years. Reversing the inevitable cooling in 1990 (2.1 percent growth in gross domestic product)

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following the artificial stoking of the economy by Pinochet's team in the run-up to the 1989 elections (which produced a 10 percent increase in GDP for 1989), growth was 6 percent in 1991 and 9.7 percent last year. Expectations are that the economy will continue to expand at a healthy rate, although probably not at 1992's impressive mark. Inflation, which climbed to 26 percent in 1990, was 21.8 percent in 1991 and slightly above 13 percent in 1992. The unemployment rate remains steady, at slightly over 5 percent, while real wages rose 4.5 percent in 1992. Industrial production is up, as are nontraditional exports and investment. These results, coupled with macroeconomic stability, have enabled Chile to become the first nation in Latin America to meet current international standards of creditworthiness, according to Standard and Poor's, the American credit rating agency, which placed it in a category of countries with low political and economic risk for investors.

Standing on this success and feeling that there is broad consensus on the basic features of a development strategy, government officials, bureaucrats, and business executives have started thinking big and planning ahead. The main foreign policy target is a free trade pact with the United States, following the yet-to-be-ratified North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States and Mexico. These two countries have expressed interest in having Chile join in tariff liberalization negotiations, but the announced changes in approach by the new Democratic administration in Washington will likely scale down Chilean expectations of speedy progress. Chile will nonetheless proceed with free trade talks already under way with Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador, and with implementation of a free trade agreement with Mexico signed in 1991. A similar pact with Argentina is pending ratification by both countries' legislatures.

Aylwin's travels to the United States, Europe, Asia, and elsewhere in Latin America have been decidedly tilted toward the trade and investment agenda. Government delegations have proudly boasted that these trips are not meant to win aid; rather, they say, Chile, a small country with a growing, healthy, open economy, is promoting free trade. Opposition parties, business, and labor organizations have been invited to send their people as official members of the national delegation—an unprecedented partnership between government and business. Last November, more than 50 representatives from leading industries took part in a visit to Asian countries (including Japan, which recently became the largest importer of Chilean goods).

In addition to trade, the government and think tanks are starting to integrate administrative change, educational reform, environmental policies, infrastructure needs, and other major matters in a coherent development strategy formulated for the long haul. Such ambitious thinking will not gain momentum, however,

unless more of those in positions of power, both in and outside government, are freed from the short-term concerns of the party politics that has inevitably assumed importance in these years of flourishing party activity within the nascent democracy.

Unsurprisingly, not everyone has rejoiced in the success of the market economy. Labor is disappointed by the Aylwin administration's well-entrenched market orientation and fears efforts to increase flexibility in the labor market, when the government had originally committed to expand protections for workers and unions and to improve working conditions after the Pinochet years. Chile's Labor Code was modified but the administration says further reform would have a negative impact on investment, employment, and flexibility, and labor has not been able to muster the strength to effectively press its case.

Aylwin has been careful not to let his team become overconfident. He has corrected those who would call Chile a Latin American jaguar, inviting comparison with the successful economies of the so-called four tigers of Asia (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea). With 40 percent of Chile's population living below the poverty line and with income distribution patterns that maintain great inequity, the president and his finance minister, Alejandro Foxley, do well to remind everyone that Chile continues to be a poor country with limited resources, facing the innumerable problems typical of underdevelopment.

## HUMAN RIGHTS: THE PAST RESURFACES

Unlike Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, where human rights abuses committed under vanquished dictatorships have ceased to blow up into major political issues, in Chile they have continued to erupt periodically, creating tension in the otherwise "nicely normal" politics. Predictably, demands from victims for justice have been hard to combine with the goal of political stability. The government initially faced tough constraints such as the 1978 law inherited from the Pinochet regime that granted amnesty for human rights violations and other crimes committed by armed forces and police, as well as the opposition, but geared toward exonerating the military; there were also repeated warnings by military chiefs who were trying to preempt civilian action. Despite these factors and the many jurisdictional disputes between civilian and military courts, more has been accomplished than had perhaps been expected. The report of the Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, the release of political prisoners, the decision to pay compensation to victims and their survivors, the improved chances for reforming the judiciary, inclusion of human rights as a subject in the school curriculum, investigation of a significant number of cases of human rights violations, and the indictment of a few of the worst perpetrators, among them the seemingly untouchable former chief of the

feared and now-abolished Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA), have at least partially satisfied demands for justice.

Aylwin's government came to power convinced that national reconciliation could not proceed without first clarifying the human rights abuses committed during Pinochet's rule and attending to at least some of the requests of the victims' families. After nine months of low key but intensive work taking testimony from victims and witnesses, the Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, which had been appointed by the president, issued a report in February 1991. In the document, known as the Rettig Report after the group's chairman, the commission lists about 2,000 cases in which the military government had, in its judgment, been responsible for extrajudicial executions and for disappearances leading to presumed death.<sup>1</sup>

The numbers, the president said himself, were worse than anticipated. When, in an emotional public address on March 4, 1991, Aylwin presented the report, he solemnly apologized on the nation's behalf for the deaths, requested cooperation in establishing the whereabouts of those still missing, and suggested it would further the goal of reconciliation if those in the military who were responsible apologized. The publicizing of the commission's work, the government felt, counted for much in the effort to close a long and painful chapter in Chilean history. That the atrocities so long denied by Pinochet's aides and supporters were finally and officially acknowledged by Chile's head of state certainly made a great difference in citizens' minds.

On the commission's recommendation the government created a Corporation on Reparation and Reconciliation, with a two-year mandate to promote compensation and aid for victims, assist in the search for remains of the disappeared, and research newly filed cases with a view to making reparations. The piece of legislation that established the body also authorized a fixed pension for survivors of the disappeared and murdered and provided for medical and other benefits.

If help from the military in uncovering the truth about the disappearances was never forthcoming, the atmosphere created by the Rettig Report encouraged occasional leaks by former agents of repression. One led to the exhumation of unmarked graves in Lot 29 of Santiago's General Cemetery; authorities are now in the process of identifying the 117 bodies unearthed. Human remains continue to be found, as was recently the case in the southern city of Lota where, at the government's request, the Court of Appeals conducted

an investigation of seven corpses that had been buried on the grounds of a former police station. But the whereabouts of the majority of the disappeared is still a mystery.

More light will likely be shed by the arrest of former collaborators and torturers who worked for the feared DINA. Osvaldo Romo, who before the 1973 military coup passed for a leader of shantytown dwellers and who soon afterward emerged as a principal DINA informant, was apprehended in Brazil last summer and extradited to Chile. Miguel Estay, a former leader of Communist Youth who shifted sides under torture, and who presumably is responsible for over 100 cases of detentions of fellow Communists, was captured in Paraguay in December and soon sent back to Chile. With the recent incorporation of plea bargaining into the Chilean legal system, much new information on the fates of the disappeared and the known dead will probably be gathered.

Unexpected leads in other cases have also brought investigators up against odious findings. The trail in the affair of the *degollados* (three members of the Communist party kidnapped in 1985 and found with their throats cut on a dirt road near the Santiago airport) had previously led to the intelligence unit of the national police, and resulted in the indictment of the head of this unit, Colonel Luis Fontaine, and the resignation of General César Mendoza, a member of the ruling junta. The case gained new impetus early last year, and civilian judge Milton Juica has since indicted 20 police officers in connection with it.

A law sponsored by Aylwin's justice minister, Francisco Cumplido, permitted the transfer in 1991 from military to civilian courts of the Letelier-Moffit case. In the hands of the military no progress was to be expected in the investigation of the 1976 assassination by car bomb in Washington, D.C., of President Salvador Allende's former cabinet minister Orlando Letelier and Letelier's assistant, Ronni Moffit. The Chilean Supreme Court had refused to allow the extradition to the United States of General Manuel Contreras, the head of DINA and a close collaborator of Pinochet's at the time of the assassination. After the transfer to civilian courts, however, things moved swiftly, and Justice Adolfo Bañados indicted Contreras and his top lieutenant, Pedro Espinoza, in September 1991. Contreras was placed under arrest after the Supreme Court upheld his indictment on murder and forgery charges. Bañados subsequently released the two on bail, and sentencing is still pending.

The reactivation of the case against Contreras in Chile's courts helped remove a significant obstacle in Chilean-United States relations, which had remained troubled for some time after the transition to civilian rule because of the assassination. Also important in this regard was the compensation paid by the Chilean government to the Letelier and Moffit families, in

<sup>1</sup>The report does not detail other violations, such as detentions and torture, where the victims remained alive. The document was subsequently published in two volumes as *Informe Rettig: Informe de la Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación* (Santiago: Talleres La Nación), May 1991.



accordance with the ruling of the Bryan commission, jointly chosen by Chile and the United States.

A critical aspect of the government's human rights policies has been the attempt to reform the judiciary, which blatantly failed to protect those rights during the Pinochet years. Even after the resumption of democracy, the courts have been too agreeable to requests by military courts to take over human rights cases, which are then often swiftly dismissed. This recurrent leniency by civilian courts led in December to a major reaction by the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of Congress, which submitted an impeachment request against three Supreme Court justices and the army's auditor general for "notable dereliction of duty." The chief justice, jointly with the heads of the army and the navy, called a meeting of the National Security Council on December 20, 1992, in an attempt to stop the congressional action. At this meeting the chief justice presented his concerns, but Aylwin managed to prevent an official statement by the NSC. The action went ahead, and the Senate, in a landmark vote on January 20, 1993, approved—with the support of three senators from the opposition—the impeachment of one of the Supreme Court justices. This momentous vote will likely enhance the chance for negotiated reforms of the judiciary, and diminish the Supreme Court's ability to resist them.

## **THE MILITARY: GAINING RESPECT FOR DEMOCRACY?**

The tension in civilian-military relations that plagued the first two years of democratic government substantially subsided toward the end last year. Appearances—so important in these relations—were increasingly normal, with military chiefs keeping within constitutional and legal precepts and showing growing signs of respect for the new civilian authorities.

Situations still arise, however, that prevent the complete normalization of these relations and an exclusive focus on professional and security concerns. These sticky situations stem from the continuing visibility of human rights issues, the effects of a recent past in which officers did not feel themselves accountable to outside authorities, the consequences of the military's involvement in domestic intelligence, and an environment in which civilian groups are more outspoken about military-related issues. Then there is the recurrent debate on prerogatives, which stems from the junta's refusal, just prior to the transfer of power in 1990, to admit exclusive presidential control over retirements and promotions, and from government proposals on adding one more civilian to the National Security Council (it currently consists of four military chiefs and four civilians) and eliminating the NSC's power to appoint members to the Constitutional Court.

The armed forces at first anticipated a worsening

scenario after the transfer of power, in which civilians would be tempted to seek retribution on human rights and other issues. Many military leaders thought democratization would give way to a surge in mass mobilizations, and believed that what they saw as a faction-prone successor coalition government would be unable to guarantee stability. Especially in the army, they prepared accordingly and General Pinochet, who remained as commander in chief, created a new staff of general officers to assist him in the task of monitoring the political process.

Witnessing the government's success and experiencing its moderation, the military's worst fears have dissipated, but it nonetheless remains alert to challenges to its autonomy, both real and imagined. Because the army has faced some tough situations in the first years of democracy, and has been subjected to public scrutiny that it was very much unaccustomed to, its members have often developed a siege mentality, regarding public criticism as escalating threats. And even if its fears have receded, influential military chiefs still harbor the suspicion that many in government are ultimately intent on weakening the army, either by impairing its internal discipline or by promoting pacifist hopes that, in the army's view, are totally at odds with the post-cold war reality.

Many of the army's unsettling experiences during the past three years have originated in human rights cases, which focused public attention on the participation of former military officers. Many other unsettling circumstances, however, originated in problems internal to the institution, and which civilian officials had no way of preventing.

One was the uncovering in late 1990 of an underground, illegal credits and loans financial operation run by a group of army officers associated with the former DINA. The operation went bankrupt, and when a civilian depositor who had tried to recover his money was found murdered the whole operation was exposed. As a result of an internal investigation, several officers—generals included—were forced to leave the army. Another incident involved an unaccounted transfer of several hundred thousand dollars from the army to one of Pinochet's sons; allegedly, the army had a debt with a firm owned by Pinochet Hiriart, which operated in the weapons market. The final report of a protracted and widely publicized investigation by a congressional committee reflected a compromise, not clarifying whether the commander in chief knew about the transfer to his son of huge sums from the service under his command. Another sordid case implicated General Salas Wenzel, a former chief of DINA, who sold the facilities of Villa Grimaldi on the outskirts of Santiago to his wife and her relatives for a song. The villa had acquired notoriety as a secret center for detention, interrogation, and torture. The new owners, associated with a construction firm, planned to demolish the

facilities and use the land for a housing project. Salas Wenzel argued the deal would prevent former victims from using the facilities as a symbol.

Perhaps the most tense moment in relations with the army came with the sudden placing of troops on alert in December 1990. Pinochet took this unprecedented step to put pressure on the government and Congress to stop what he perceived as a concerted campaign against him. The army move created a confusing situation and an embarrassing position for the government, which had to announce that the army was conducting previously planned "coordination exercises."

A denunciation broadcast on television in September 1992—spectacularly made by a masked individual claiming to be an army officer—in which army officers were accused of widespread participation in intelligence spying on civilians, again muddled relations with the government, with generals blaming officials for encouraging the whole thing. The revelations later acquired an ominous air of reality when it was confirmed that an army officer assigned to his service's communications headquarters had taped a compromising private telephone conversation of one of Renovación Nacional's pre-candidates for the presidency, which was later televised, with powerful negative repercussions for that opposition party of the right.

Government-military relations were also occasionally affected during 1990 and 1991 by the escalation of violent terrorist actions by extreme-left groups, which resulted in the killing of numerous carabineros and a wave of bank robberies and other assaults. Shortly after Aylwin's inauguration, extremists shot former junta member General Gustavo Leigh and another retired air force chief, both of whom survived. The assassination in April 1991 of Senator Jaime Guzmán—a former adviser of Pinochet's, co-drafter of the 1980 constitution, and a young, admired leader of the right—pointed to the magnitude of the extremist's threat. The government increased the size of the police force and, in collaboration with the opposition, created a new Directorate for Public Safety within the Interior Ministry, charged with the coordination of intelligence with the police and the military on domestic violent groups.

Before assuming office, leaders of the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (the present government coalition) had announced that they would strongly encourage a decision by Pinochet to step down as commander in chief of the army (which, under a provision in the 1980 constitution, neither he nor the chiefs of the other services had to do for eight years). But once in, Aylwin and his coalition partners stopped pressing the issue, respecting Pinochet's prerogatives and hoping to create a cooperative framework. These hopes were frustrated by the tensions already noted and by the tough stances taken alternately by Pinochet

and by the government, especially Defense Minister Patricio Rojas.

As in most new democracies, the initial period in Chile was one during which both sides strove to influence the practical definition of the new rules to their own advantage. This period is now over, the interpretation of formal and informal rules having been settled. The government's views prevailed in several important instances, and the presidency was significantly strengthened when a court upheld Aylwin's refusal to approve the promotion of an army general. On the other hand, the military has actually been recognized as a force and as a tremendous lobbyist on different issues of national import, and has successfully championed the belief that its core constitutional role as guarantor of Chile's political institutions is untouchable. Both the government and the military now seem to have entered a period of gentle accommodation. Government and Concertación leaders will privately admit that Pinochet's remaining in his post, despite all the tensions and difficulties, has ultimately been beneficial since it prevented a surge of undisciplined anti-government feeling in the ranks.

## POLITICAL PARTIES IN SEARCH OF AN IDENTITY

The municipal elections of June 1992 expanded democratization to the local level, terminating the mandate of Pinochet-appointed mayors across the country. The use of a proportional representation formula within districts also made it possible to gauge the exact electoral weight of each party in both the governing and opposition coalitions. Voters delivered a sober and healthy verdict, frustrating expectations for runaway victories or dramatic swings in preferences on either side. Support for Concertación parties reached 53.5 percent, while the rightist parties running with independents under the banner of "Participación y Progreso" garnered just under 30 percent. Outside these pacts, the Communist party did surprisingly well, winning over 6 percent of the vote, and the centrist Center Union (which could flock either to the opposition or the government) came away with 8.1 percent. Equally important was the distribution inside each coalition. In the government coalition, the Christian Democratic party validated its claim to be the country's largest party by far, but stayed under the 30 percent mark, frustrating those who thought government success would benefit President Aylwin's party more than the rest. The Radical party's 4.9 percent kept it from extinction and introduced a buffer in the competition between Christian Democrats and their allies to the left. Among these, the Party for Democracy (PPD) did not bear out the widespread forecast that it would practically swallow the Socialist party, which obtained a respectable 8.7 percent while the PPD placed only half a percentage point above, at 9.2. On

the right voters also wisely maintained a balance. The Independent Democratic Union (UDI), the party farthest to the right and whose allegiance to the tenets of Pinochet's rule is the strongest, received 10.2 percent of the vote, while Renovación Nacional (RN) captured 13.4 percent, and also held a slightly larger share of "independent" candidates elected within Participación y Progreso.

Not only did voters maintain a salutary and humbling balance within each coalition, but they also continued the historical tendency to distribute votes between left, center, and right, and perhaps also lent support to those who seek a return to proportional representation in congressional elections.<sup>2</sup> This result certainly strengthens the need for negotiation and consensus in Chilean politics.

The rebirth of electoral politics, especially with these distribution patterns, creates the need for strong identities and distinct profiles for parties that want to gain an edge in a competitive environment. When the electorate values moderation and center-prone politics, building an identity is especially difficult for parties at either end of the continuum. The Chilean political process is now squarely up against these problems, especially in light of the high stakes involved in the approaching election this December, which will give Chile a new president for an eight-year term, unless current constitutional stipulations are altered.

Animated by the need to develop a distinct identity within Concertación, the left—Socialists and the PPD—nominated charismatic Ricardo Lagos, who resigned from his post as education minister last September to initiate his presidential campaign. Lagos's contingent argues that he is the best candidate for the coalition and that the Christian Democrats, having had the first president of the reborn democracy, cannot hope to monopolize the office forever. The Christian Democrats in turn nominated Eduardo Frei who, although resented by more seasoned politicians in the party who felt they had a better claim to the nomination, greatly benefits from the popularity of his father, a former president. Now Frei is showing twice as much support as Lagos in the polls, and Christian Democrats argue that, being the largest party, they should continue to hold the presidency.

Lagos's supporters have said they are intent on running all the way, even if this means having two

Concertación candidates. Christian Democrats have replied that that option would also imply running in separate lists for Congress, which would hurt the Socialists and the PPD considerably. Fearing intensification of the rivalry, Aylwin has stepped in to offer formulas that would maintain the Concertación as the governing coalition well into the future.

Because internal competition on the right has been much less amicable, the rightist parties are now paying a high price. Perhaps the root of the right's identity problem lies in the Concertación's success in governing the country and the lack of hesitation with which it has wrested from the right the banner of economic modernization. Business, a traditional and "natural" constituency of the right, has been supportive of Concertación policies, especially since the right has not presented itself as a viable alternative and is distracted by infighting. This identity problem makes reliance on attractive individuals all the more necessary for rightist parties.

Such individuals were found mainly in Renovación Nacional, since UDI's Hernán Büchi had lost to Aylwin in 1989 and had in addition spent too much time abroad on consulting trips. Sebastián Piñera, a young, energetic, and successful businessman turned senator who voted against Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite and who boasted of his modernizing and nonideological stance, emerged as a promising candidate for the right. He was opposed, however, by senior RN senators, especially former Pinochet interior minister Onofre Jarpa. Jarpa supported instead a young economist and member of Congress, the charismatic Evelyn Matthei, daughter of the former moderate junta member and air force chief General Fernando Matthei. A scandal involving a taped telephone conversation in which Piñera discussed how to hurt Matthei politically backfired on Matthei, who had given the media the tape; both candidates took themselves out of the race.

The right's quick recovery is essential for a balanced outcome in the December national elections. The Piñera-Matthei fiasco will probably lead the right to select an older, more experienced candidate with links both to the authoritarian past and to current efforts at democratization and modernization; this would, in fact, better represent the right's diversity. Recovery is also essential if the right is to take up again the goal of recreating itself more in the image of a European-style center-right that is strongly behind the democratic system. This would also revive hopes for agreement on institutional reforms that would definitely make Chile once again a full-fledged democracy. ■

<sup>2</sup>Arturo Valenzuela and Peter Siavelis, "Ley electoral y estabilidad democrática: un ejercicio de simulación para el caso de Chile," *Estudios Públicos*, no. 43 (Winter 1991).



# BOOK REVIEWS

## ON LATIN AMERICA

### **Panama: The Whole Story**

By Kevin Buckley. New York: Touchstone, 1992. 304 pp., \$11.00.

The tale of General Manuel Antonio Noriega and his close relations and eventual falling out with the United States is fascinating—and at times unbelievable.

In *Panama*, Kevin Buckley unravels the plot. He begins with the brutal killing in 1985 of Noriega opponent Hugo Spadafora—a killing that would haunt the Panamanian dictator until his surrender to United States forces in January 1990 after the December 1989 invasion. The book traces Noriega's final four years in power, showing how his failure to understand the American media and United States diplomacy led to his downfall. Buckley also makes clear that the Reagan and Bush administrations were more than willing to tolerate Noriega's drug trafficking, election-fixing, and merciless dictatorship in exchange for cooperation.

Buckley's narrative reads at times like fiction, delving into the personalities and emotions of, as Buckley himself dubs them, his "cast of characters." This makes *Panama* a fast and informative read.

Julie E. Sangster

### **Peru Under Fire:**

#### **Human Rights since the Return to Democracy**

By Americas Watch. New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1992. 169 pp., \$23.50.

With *Peru Under Fire*, written and researched by Cynthia Brown, Americas Watch has published a bleak overview of Peru's human rights problems over the past decade. Given recent events in the country, it would be difficult to overemphasize the extent of the violence inflicted on Peruvians, especially civilians.

While this book holds the Maoist rebel group Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) accountable for most of the brutal human rights abuses, it also acknowledges that the insurgent movement has evolved in response to economic and social grievances that have not been addressed by the Peruvian government. In an attempt to remedy this, Americas Watch has delineated strong recommendations for dealing with the root problems without resort to the strictly military methods currently in use.

J. E. S.

### **Leaders, Leadership, and U.S. Policy in Latin America**

By Michael J. Kryzanek. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992. 249 pp., \$45.00.

As the title of this thorough if not very dynamic book implies, *Leaders, Leadership, and U.S. Policy in Latin*

*America* focuses on the importance of leaders and types of leadership in relations with the United States. Through case studies, Michael Kryzanek illustrates different types of leadership—broken down into the general categories of military, civilian, and revolutionary—and the ways in which Latin American leaders react to the policies of the United States and the region's other nations.

Kryzanek concludes that with the recent shift in Latin American countries to free market economies and increased civilian rule, coupled with diminishing United States security concerns in the post-cold war era, Latin American leaders are in a good bargaining position with the United States, if not on an entirely equal footing.

J. E. S.

### **Forgotten Fatherland:**

#### **The Search for Elisabeth Nietzsche**

By Ben Macintyre. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1992. 256 pp., \$22.00.

Usually books about Germany's love affair with Latin America take the form of a spy thriller in which Nazi hunters seek their prey in steamy jungles and remote mountain villages. *Forgotten Fatherland* delivers the jungles and villages, but it has its beginnings before Adolf Hitler was even born.

In Paraguay in 1886, philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche's sister, Elisabeth, with her husband Bernhard Förster, founded a strictly Aryan/Lutheran/vegetarian colony known as Nueva Germania that was located in a backwater north of Asunción. The objective was to maintain "racial purity" and ersatz Germanic values, isolated and thus insulated from a supposed international Jewish "conspiracy."

Ben Macintyre's storytelling is at its best in his firsthand accounts of the remains of Nueva Germania and his interviews with the few "racially pure" descendants of the colony's founders. The writing here is simple and direct, and at times hilarious.

Unfortunately for those interested in Latin America, the book is not only about Paraguay; at least half the pages are devoted to a personal, richly detailed account of Elisabeth Nietzsche's life in Europe. The author provides excellent reporting on how the female Nietzsche twisted her brother's ideas—and even wrote portions of his later works—and eventually became a darling of the Nazis before her death in 1935.

Macintyre jumps back and forth from Paraguay to Germany abruptly and awkwardly, leaving the reader

with a sense of incompleteness. But if the construction seems jarring, that was how Nietzsche ran her life.

Sean Patrick Murphy

### **The Patient Impatience**

By Tomás Borge. Translated by Russell Bartley, Darwin Flakoll, and Sylvia Yoneda. Willimantic, Conn.:

Curbstone Press, 1992. 452 pp., \$24.95.

"Lush" doesn't even begin to describe this book.

Tomás Borge's lyricism (captured by the translators) conveys a richness of boyhood memories and recollections of building a revolution. The humor in parts of this memoir is inescapable, as is the tremendous pain inflicted by the loss of friends (such as Carlos Fonseca, founder of the Sandinistas).

The author doesn't spare himself from his sharp wit and wry observations. Rather, he includes himself in a mind-boggling cast of characters (an indication of his powerful memory), and shows how these varied people helped shaped his vision not only of the Nicaraguan revolution but also of life.

The former Sandinista minister of the interior's poetic style brings the reader near to his passion (sometimes uncomfortably close) and softens the revolutionary rhetoric that creeps into this testimony to a struggle that will affect generations of policymakers in Latin America and the United States.

S. P. M.

### **Religion and Politics in Latin America:**

#### **Liberation Theology and Christian Democracy**

By Edward A. Lynch. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991. 200 pp., \$42.95.

Liberation theology and Christian democracy have battled for the hearts and minds (and souls) of Latin Americans—and neither has won.

According to Edward Lynch, these two Catholic-rooted political movements have failed in their respective missions in Nicaragua and Venezuela, for essentially the same reasons.

After giving a history of how the ideologies developed, Lynch describes how each has abandoned its original principles in order to survive politically. Ironically, it is this pragmatism that has caused these forces to fall out of favor with their followers.

Lynch attributes the return of Nicaraguans to the traditional, hierarchical church, still dominant in Venezuela, to the fact that Roman Catholicism has maintained greater credibility than alternative belief systems for those seeking solace from economic and political injustice.

By sacrificing their moral underpinnings for brief episodes of power, liberation theology and Christian democratic parties and associations have seen their followers flock to the morally strict but politically less adaptable Catholic Church.

S. P. M.

### **Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict**

By William F. Sater. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990. 249 pp., \$30.00, cloth; \$15.00, paper.

Except for the period of General Augusto Pinochet's rule, Chile and the United States have never gotten along well.

In his colorful history of relations between the two countries, William Sater describes how each viewed the other as a competitor until the end of the nineteenth century, at which point the "Colossus of the North" began outstripping its southern neighbor in nearly every area. By following Chile's advancement to become the most powerful Andean and southern cone country and then its eventual decline, Sater allows the reader to get a sense of the resentment and betrayal felt by many Chileans when they think about the United States.

Although his straightforward, conversational style leads to a few pat conclusions, Sater goes a long way toward revealing how geography, racism and ethnocentrism, and technology have affected the relationship between these two countries from the beginning to the present day.

S. P. M.

### **Inside Central America:**

#### **Its People, Politics, and History**

By Clifford Kraus. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991. 316 pp., \$11.00.

Clifford Kraus continues the tradition of the correspondent who, on finishing a tour of duty in another country, comes back to the States to tell the "truth" about what he or she saw. More often than not, the book is praised for its insight, the author awarded an editing or high-level correspondent position, and the path cleared for another young reporter to make his or her mark.

Nowhere has this trail been more apparent in the last decade than in Central America. The Reagan administration's obsession with Nicaragua's Sandinistas and El Salvador's rebels transformed what was once (and what has again become, unfortunately) a "backwater" for a reporter seeking the big story. Earlier works by Raymond Bonner on Salvador, Shirley Christian on Nicaragua, and Christopher Dickey on the contras are now joined by Kraus's volume, which looks at the six largest countries on the isthmus. The result has been well worth the wait.

Kraus began covering Central America in 1977, and in the next 13 years had a first-hand view of the turmoil that wracked the region. It is these accounts that make *Inside Central America* especially valuable. Less valuable are the quick histories of the countries covered; an attempt to reach the more general reader, they detract from Kraus's own vivid—and evenhanded—recounting of what he has seen.

W. W. F.

# THE MONTH IN REVIEW

January 1993

## INTERNATIONAL

### AIDS Crisis

Jan. 15—In Geneva, the World Health Organization announces that the number of reported cases worldwide of people with acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) has risen to more than 600,000 but that the real number is likely to be 2.5 million; more than one-third of the reported cases are in the US. The UN agency also says 13 million people worldwide have been infected with the virus that causes AIDS.

### Council of the Euro-Arctic Region

Jan. 11—In Kirkenes, Norway, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and officials from Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland form a council to promote trade and cooperation and the cleanup of pollution and radiation contamination in the area around the Barents Sea.

### European Community (EC)

Jan. 1—Tariff and customs barriers along with other measures inhibiting the flow of people and capital among the 12 EC members—Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland—are formally lifted, creating a single market of 345 million people.

Jan. 8—In Paris, an EC-commissioned team of investigators releases a report that estimates 20,000 Muslim women have been raped by Bosnian Serb militiamen; this, the report says, "cannot be seen as incidental to the main purposes of the aggression but as serving a strategic purpose in itself."

### International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

(See Intl, UN)

### Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Jan. 13—In Paris, more than 120 nations begin a 3-day meeting on a pact to ban the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. The treaty calls for the destruction of all chemical weapons within 10 years of its implementation on January 15, 1995, and for on-site inspections, the disclosure of chemical warfare capability by signatories, and sanctions against all countries—nonsignatories included—that violate it. Of the 3 nations that admit to possessing chemical weapons—the US, Russia, and Iraq—only the US and Russia are signing the agreement.

### Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

(See Israel)

### United Nations (UN)

(See also Intl, AIDS Crisis; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Cambodia; Croatia; Ethiopia; Haiti; Iraq; Kuwait; Somalia)

Jan. 6—American, British, French, and Russian representatives warn Iraqi representative Nizar Hamdoun that Iraq has 48 hours to remove surface-to-air missiles deployed yesterday near the no-fly zone below the 32d parallel in southern Iraq or face military action.

Jan. 11—The Security Council condemns Iraqi incursions into the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait and warns

that Iraq faces "serious consequences" if it does not return the munitions and equipment taken in the raids.

In a letter to the Security Council released today, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali says Salvadoran President Alfredo Cristiani's plan to move 7 high-ranking military officers to diplomatic posts violates the terms of the accords that ended El Salvador's 12-year civil war last month; the 7 officers—including Defense Minister René Emilio Ponce—are to be purged along with 87 others as part of the peace agreement between the government and the rebel Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front.

In Bonn, Boutros-Ghali asks German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and Chancellor Helmut Kohl to allow German troops to participate in "peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcing, and peace building operations"; Germany's constitution forbids its forces from being used except in defensive missions in NATO countries.

Jan. 15—Officials say the Iraqi government has informed the UN that it will allow IAEA inspectors to enter the country on UN planes.

## AFGHANISTAN

Jan. 1—The 1,335 members of the country's special assembly vote to create a parliament and an army as well as to make radio and television broadcasts subject to Islamic law.

Jan. 2—Burhanuddin Rabbani, who had been acting president in an interim coalition government since June, is sworn in as president after being elected to the post by the special assembly; 5 of the country's 9 principal factions boycotted the December 30 election for the special assembly.

Jan. 21—In Kabul, government and rebel troops exchange artillery fire, wounding about 100 people; at least 300 people have been wounded in 3 days of fighting between government and Hezb-i-Islami fighters.

## ALGERIA

Jan. 1—Muslim fundamentalists attack a police post in Ksar el-Hirane, killing 5 police officers.

Jan. 7—A military court sentences 69 defendants, most of them members of the armed services, who had been convicted of organizing an armed conspiracy against the state; 19 receive the death penalty, 4 life in prison, and 46 others jail terms of up to 10 years; 32 other defendants in similar cases have been given the death penalty since an electoral victory by Muslim fundamentalist parties and post-election disturbances in February 1992.

## ANGOLA

Jan. 3—The official press agency reports that nearly 100 fighters from the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) were killed in a battle with government forces in Lubango, the capital of southern Huila province; the government now controls the city.

Jan. 5—Prime Minister Marcolino Moco acknowledges on Portuguese radio that there is undeclared war in Angola; disputed elections held in September–October led to the breaching of a 1991 cease-fire in Angola's 16-year civil war. Heavy fighting between UNITA and government forces is



reported in the seaport of Benguela, 240 miles south of Luanda, the capital.

Jan. 8—The medical relief group Doctors Without Borders reports that government troops have recaptured Cuito, the capital of central Bié province, from UNITA.

Jan. 9—National police launch an offensive on Huambo, the country's 2d-largest city and UNITA's military and ethnic base; calm is reported elsewhere after a week of fighting in several cities.

Jan. 20—UNITA rebels capture the oil-producing town of Soyo on the northwest coast, reportedly with support from Zairian troops and foreign mercenaries; yesterday UNITA forces retook Huambo from government troops.

Jan. 23—Reacting to reports that Zaire is aiding UNITA rebels, mobs in and around Luanda kill at least 62 Zairians and people mistaken for Zairians and rape at least 7, according to the Zairian embassy.

The government announces that yesterday troops shot down a South African transport plane flying out of Jamba with supplies for UNITA forces; President José Eduardo dos Santos said in an interview yesterday that "high-ranking army officials" in South Africa continue to help UNITA rebels, although possibly without the knowledge of their government. A South African Foreign Ministry spokesman says no South African military aircraft are missing and states that his government has not aided the insurgents since the May 1991 cease-fire.

Jan. 28—Tens of thousands of Angolans have been killed in widespread fighting over the past 3 weeks, *The New York Times* reports; UN officials say that the conflict has created millions of refugees and that more than 1.5 million people are in danger of starving; they estimate that UNITA controls 105 of Angola's 164 municipalities.

## BANGLADESH

(See *Pakistan*)

## BELGIUM

(See *Intl*, *EC*)

## BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

(See also *Intl*, *EC*; *Croatia*; *US*)

Jan. 8—One of the country's 3 deputy prime ministers, Hakiya Turajlic, is shot and killed by a Serb soldier at a checkpoint between Butmir airport and Sarajevo while being escorted by French UN peacekeeping forces.

Jan. 9—In Geneva, Bosnian Croat militia leader Mate Boban says Muslims killed 3 Croats in Sarajevo January 7, including the director of Bosnia's Agency for Social Resources.

Jan. 10—British UN peacekeepers escorting an aid convoy fire on Serb militiamen who attack them near Kladanj; the UN troops suffered no casualties and the number of Serb casualties is unreported; this is the 1st use of heavy weapons by UN peacekeeping forces in Bosnia.

At peace talks in Geneva, Bosnian Serb militia leader Radovan Karadzic apologizes to the Bosnian government delegation for the assassination of Turajlic.

Jan. 12—Government officials say more than 430 people across the country have died in recent days from starvation, sickness, and exposure.

Jan. 15—Serb militias backed by the Yugoslav army fire artillery shells into Sarajevo, killing 7 people.

Jan. 18—Members of a UN convoy that reached the Muslim community of Zepa in eastern Bosnia in the last 2 days say officials there told them 900 people died from hunger, exposure, military attacks, and disease during a nearly 10-month-long siege by Serb militias.

Jan. 20—In Pale, the self-declared parliament of the Bosnian Serbs votes, 55 to 15 with 1 abstention, to approve a peace plan put together by UN special envoy Cyrus Vance and EC representative Lord Owen that recognizes Bosnia as an independent country with 10 autonomous regions based on ethnicity.

Jan. 26—At least 10 people are killed and 70 wounded in Sarajevo in artillery attacks by Serb forces.

## CAMBODIA

Jan. 4—Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the head of state, says in a letter to the UN that he will no longer cooperate with the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) or with the Cambodian government because of violent attacks against Funcinpec, the political party led by his son Prince Norodom Ranariddh; Funcinpec officials say 6 people have been killed at party offices, while some of the 20 other opposition parties have reported assassination attempts and attacks on their offices; party members have blamed troops acting under orders from Prime Minister Hun Sen's government.

Jan. 12—In the northwest village of Ang Kron, unidentified assailants kill 2 Cambodian employees of the UN and a civilian at a voter registration station.

Jan. 19—UN officials report that the Khmer Rouge is holding 12 UN peacekeepers in Pailin, in western Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge frees 2 other groups of UN peacekeepers, in north-central Kompong Chhnang province and northeast of Phnom Penh.

Jan. 28—The government and 3 guerrilla groups agree to hold UN-monitored national elections in late May; the Khmer Rouge yesterday missed a deadline to take part in the elections, but UNTAC head Yasushi Akashi says the group may still be allowed to participate.

Sihanouk has lifted his suspension of cooperation with the UN, according to *The New York Times*; it also reports that the government has denied involvement in attacks on opposition political parties, saying that the Khmer Rouge is responsible.

## CANADA

Jan. 29—The government imposes tariffs on steel manufactured in several countries, including the US, saying they sell their product at unfairly low prices; the action comes 2 days after the US imposed similar measures on 18 countries, including Canada.

## CHINA

(See also *Japan*; *US*)

Jan. 28—A shuffle of the armed forces in which new commanders or political commissars have been named for 6 of the country's 7 military regions has been completed, according to today's *New York Times*. The changes have greatly lessened the influence of half-brothers Yang Shangkun and Yang Baibing; Yang Shangkun, a former general, is finishing a term as China's president, and Yang Baibing was removed as the army's top political commissar.

## COLOMBIA

Jan. 21—In Bogotá, 17 people are wounded by 2 bomb explosions; officials say a group known as the Antioquia Rebel Movement headed by escaped drug trafficker Pablo Escobar is responsible.

Jan. 30—A bomb blast in a busy shopping district in Bogotá kills 20 people and injures 60; no group claims responsibility, although Escobar is suspected.

Jan. 31—In Medellín, 4 people are wounded and several buildings are damaged by 2 bomb explosions.

## COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS)

(See also *Intl, Council of the Euro-Arctic Region, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, UN; US*)

Jan. 9—In Tajikistan, the government begins criminal proceedings against the country's religious leader, Akhbar Turdzhonzoda, known as the Azi; Shodmon Yusuf, head of the Democratic party; and Dovlat Usmon, deputy leader of the Islamic Renaissance party. A state of emergency was declared January 7; as many as 40,000 people have been killed since last spring in the civil war between former Communists, who retook power in November, and a democratic-Islamic coalition.

Jan. 18—The Russian government rescinds a decree signed by new Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin December 31 that set strict limits on the profits monopoly producers could make from basic foods.

Jan. 22—At a CIS summit meeting in Minsk, Belarus, the 10 full members and Azerbaijan, which has observer status, agree to sign a memorandum laying out principles of loose cooperation for the commonwealth, which was created in December 1991; they will consider further a commonwealth charter calling for greater integration.

Jan. 26—The value of the Russian ruble, still the currency of most of the former Soviet Union, falls 15% in trading at the Moscow currency exchange, to a record low of 568 to the US dollar; last week Deputy Prime Minister Anatoli Chubais told a news conference that inflation in January rose 40% and that the trend appeared to be toward a monthly rate of close to 60%.

Jan. 29—In Armenia, a natural gas pipeline that is the country's only source of outside fuel is repaired after an explosion in Georgia shut it down for a week; Azerbaijan, which has blockaded the country because of the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, says it is not responsible for the sabotage; the fuel crisis has closed most industry.

On his 1st visit to India, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, describing his country as a "Euro-Asian power" that is "moving away from a pro-Western emphasis," says Russia will continue to supply India with cryogenic (low-temperature) rocket technology; the US said last year that a 1990 Soviet-Indian sales agreement for the technology, worth \$250 million, violated the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime. Russia and India also agree to conduct trade only in hard currency and to set the latter's debt to Russia at \$8 billion because of the ruble's fall.

## CROATIA

Jan. 22—Army units attack Serb-held positions in Maslenica and the port city of Zadar; Ivan Milas, a Croatian vice president, says the attacks came after Serbs delayed returning the areas to Croatian control as called for in the January 1992 UN-sponsored cease-fire agreement; state radio in Belgrade says the president of the self-declared Serbian Krajina Republic, Goran Hadzic, has declared war on Croatia.

Jan. 23—Government officials say their forces have taken a bridge at Maslenica and part of Zemunik airport near Zadar as fighting continues between army troops and Serb militiamen. Serb forces block UN peacekeeping troops from entering or leaving 2 of the 4 zones under UN protection; UN forces release a statement saying Serb militias have stolen heavy weapons from UN storage sites in all 4 areas.

Jan. 25—Croatian forces capture Zemunik airport; 2 French UN peacekeepers are killed and 3 wounded by artillery blasts near their position.

In Washington, US officials say a ship carrying surface-to-surface missiles, ammunition, pistols, and jeeps bound for Rijeka, a Croatian port, was recently intercepted by Italian destroyers in the Adriatic Sea; the cargo, they say, is believed to have been sent from Iran to aid the Muslim government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Jan. 28—After firing artillery rounds at Kenyan UN troops, who later are routed by Serb militias, Croatian forces take control of the Peruca dam near the town of Sinj.

## CUBA

(See *US*)

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

(See also *Czech Republic; Slovakia*)

Jan. 1—At midnight, after amicable negotiations, Czechoslovakia officially splits into 2 independent countries, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

## CZECH REPUBLIC

(See also *Czechoslovakia*)

Jan. 26—Parliament elects Vaclav Havel president of the new Czech Republic; Havel resigned as president of Czechoslovakia last July after Slovak deputies blocked his reelection to the post.

## DENMARK

(See also *Intl, Council of the Euro-Arctic Region, EC*)

Jan. 14—Prime Minister Poul Schluter says he will resign after more than 10 years in his post because of charges that in the late 1980s he misled parliament about immigration restrictions on Tamil refugees.

## DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Jan. 28—The government recalls all 4 of its diplomats to Haiti and increases military forces along the border with Haiti; Foreign Ministry officials give no reason for the action.

## EGYPT

Jan. 4—In Dairut, Muslim fundamentalists shoot 2 Coptic Christians, killing 1 and wounding the other; yesterday a Coptic church was burned in the city.

Jan. 5—In the southern city of Asyut, Muslim militants fire on a bus carrying 20 Japanese tourists; there are no casualties.

## EL SALVADOR

(See *Intl, UN*)

## ETHIOPIA

Jan. 4—Security forces in Addis Ababa, the capital, clash with 2,000 students protesting UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's planned visit to Eritrea province, where a UN-sponsored referendum on independence is scheduled for April; unofficial reports say at least 1 student was killed and about 40 injured.

## FINLAND

(See *Intl, Council of the Euro-Arctic Region*)

## FRANCE

(See *Intl, EC, UN; Iraq*)

## GERMANY

(See also *Intl, EC, UN*)

Jan. 1—In Essen, 250,000 demonstrators protest attacks on foreigners; about 2 million people have taken part in anti-racism demonstrations across the country since an outbreak of neo-Nazi violence last fall.

Jan. 13—Former East German leader Erich Honecker, who has been diagnosed with terminal cancer, is released from a Berlin prison and allowed to fly to Chile; Honecker, along with ailing ex-Prime Minister Willi Stoph and former head of secret police Erich Mielke, has been separated from a case charging 6 former senior East German officials with manslaughter in the shooting deaths of 13 citizens attempting to flee East Germany.

Figures released by the national statistics office show western Germany last year posted its worst annual growth rate since 1982, with GDP up only 0.8%; eastern German GNP rose 6.4%; overall, German growth was 1.3%.

Jan. 19—The Green party and Alliance 90, a coalition of 5 eastern German human rights groups, voted to merge at a convention in Hanover last weekend, *The New York Times* reports; the party is expected to become the country's 3d-largest.

Jan. 27—Prosecutors say Honecker's manslaughter trial will resume February 7 but acknowledge that the former leader is unlikely to return from Chile.

## GUATEMALA

Jan. 24—About 2,400 refugees from the country's civil war march through Guatemala City, the capital; they represent the 1st of at least 43,000 indigenous Guatemalans who fled to Mexico during the government's counterinsurgency campaign against the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union in the 1980s; President Jorge Serrano's administration agreed in October during peace talks with the guerrillas to help resettle the refugees and provide them with land.

## HAITI

(See also *Dominican Republic; US*)

Jan. 17—UN envoy Dante Caputo announces the Haitian military has agreed to allow as many as 500 UN and OAS human rights observers to be stationed throughout the country; the OAS currently has 16 human rights monitors in Haiti, who are permitted to operate only in Port-au-Prince, the capital.

Jan. 18—Most citizens boycott elections held today for 10 senate seats and 3 seats in the lower house of parliament.

## ICELAND

(See *Intl, Council of the Euro-Arctic Region*)

## INDIA

(See also *CIS*)

Jan. 6—At least 40 people are killed and 100 wounded by paramilitary troops in Sopore, a town in the secessionist Kashmir Valley, after militants allegedly attacked border police.

Jan. 16—Bombay is quiet after 10 days of Hindu-Muslim violence and arson that also erupted in Ahmadabad, in neighboring Gujarat state; more than 500 people died in Bombay and 70 in Ahmadabad, and hundreds were injured; most of the victims were Muslims; police report more than 3,500 arrests.

Jan. 17—Responding to criticism that he has been indecisive in dealing with Hindu-Muslim violence, Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao replaces 14 members of his cabinet with 12 new ministers.

## IRAN

(See *Croatia*)

## IRAQ

(See also *Intl, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, UN; Kuwait*)

Jan. 4—The military has deployed surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) south of the 32d parallel, US officials say; in August the US, France, and Great Britain set up a no-fly zone south of the 32d parallel to protect Shiites in the area.

Jan. 9—The US government issues a statement saying Iraq has dismantled and dispersed SAM batteries that had been deployed near the 32d parallel.

Jan. 10—Approximately 250 Iraqi soldiers enter a demilitarized zone along the border with Kuwait and seize Silk Worm anti-ship missiles as well as other arms and ammunition before returning to Iraq; the zone will become Kuwaiti territory once the new border between the 2 countries drawn by the UN becomes effective January 15.

The government prevents 70 International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors from entering the country on a non-Iraqi charter plane from Bahrain.

Jan. 11—The administration of US President George Bush says Iraq has moved a battery of SAMs north of the 36th parallel into the no-fly zone of protected Kurdistan.

Jan. 13—Approximately 115 American, British, and French planes bomb SAM sites in southern Iraq in retaliation for a variety of recent actions by the Iraqi government that defy conditions set after the Persian Gulf War by the UN and the 3 Western countries.

The government says it will discontinue its raids into the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait.

Jan. 14—State television announces 17 soldiers and 2 civilians were killed in yesterday's air attacks.

US Defense Department officials say yesterday's raid destroyed 1 of 4 targeted SAM batteries and heavily damaged 2 air defense command sites.

Jan. 16—At a news conference in Baghdad, Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz says Iraq will guarantee the safety of UN aircraft carrying UN inspectors only if they stay north of the 32d parallel.

Jan. 17—US ships in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea fire at least 40 cruise missiles at an industrial complex near Baghdad that US officials say is part of the Iraqi nuclear development program; at least 2 people are killed and as many as 30 wounded when the Al-Rashid Hotel in Baghdad is hit by a cruise missile. A US plane destroys a SAM battery in northern Iraq and an Iraqi plane that flies above the 36th parallel is shot down by a US plane.

Jan. 18—Government officials say 21 people died in air strikes today by 18 British, French, and US warplanes against air defense command centers.

Jan. 19—Government officials say they have declared a cease-fire and will not fire on US planes and that restrictions on flights carrying UN inspectors have been lifted.

Two US planes drop cluster bombs on an anti-aircraft artillery site after being fired on and another avoids anti-aircraft artillery fire in northern Iraq; a US plane fires a missile at a SAM radar site after the radar locked on to its position.

Jan. 22—For the 2d day in a row, American jets attack a radar site after its radar was directed at a patrol over the no-fly zone in the north.

## IRELAND

(See also *Intl, EC*)

Jan. 12—The Labour party agrees to participate in a government headed by Prime Minister Albert Reynolds of Fianna



Fail; this is the 1st coalition in the country's 70 years of independence between Labour and the more conservative Fianna Fail.

## ISRAEL

(See also *Lebanon*)

Jan. 3—In Jerusalem a Shin Bet intelligence agent is killed by an Arab attacker.

In the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip, Israeli soldiers kill 1 Palestinian and wound 9 others after their jeep is hit with rocks and overturned; according to the army, Arab assailants killed another Palestinian for cooperating with Israeli authorities.

Jan. 9—The International Committee of the Red Cross returns 2 of 413 Palestinians deported by the government to Israel's self-declared "security zone" in southern Lebanon December 17; Israeli defense officials have said 10 of the 413 were expelled "without a legal decision to deport them."

Jan. 13—The army announces 6 more of the 413 Palestinians were deported by mistake.

Jan. 19—In a 39-20 vote, parliament repeals a 1986 ban on contact between Israelis and the Palestine Liberation Organization; less than half the 120 members take part in the vote.

Jan. 22—Israeli soldiers shoot and wound 18 Palestinians during demonstrations in Gaza.

Jan. 23—The Red Cross evacuates 13 of the exiled Palestinians to Israeli-controlled territory because they were mistakenly identified as militants and 4 because they are seriously ill; 2 others also described as mistakenly deported stay in the exiles' camp by choice; 11 of the 13 will be imprisoned because of their alleged participation in antigovernment violence in the Israeli-occupied territories.

Jan. 28—The supreme court unanimously confirms the legality of the Palestinians' deportations.

Jan. 30—In Gaza, 2 soldiers are killed and 1 is wounded in an ambush security officials say was the work of Hamas militants.

Jan. 31—The government announces it has arrested 43 people, including 3 Arab-Americans, whom they suspect of being members of Hamas.

## ITALY

(See also *Intl, EC*)

Jan. 15—Police announce the arrest in Palermo of Salvatore "Toto" Riina, the presumed "boss of all bosses" of the Sicilian Mafia, who has been in hiding since 1969; Riina was wanted in connection with more than 100 murders.

## JAPAN

Jan. 5—Under heavy guard, a ship carrying more than 1 ton of reprocessed plutonium back from France for use in experimental breeder reactors docks in Tokai after a 2-month journey; Japan plans 30 such shipments over the next 20 years.

Jan. 7—According to the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, federal prosecutors said last month they do not plan to indict former Liberal Democratic party vice president Shin Kanemaru on charges that he accepted an illegal donation of about \$4 million from the Tokyo Sagawa Kyubin parcel delivery and trucking company; Kanemaru resigned from his position in August 1992.

Jan. 27—The Ministry of International Trade and Industry reports that industrial production fell 6.1% last year. On January 22 the Ministry of Finance released figures showing Japan's overall merchandise trade surplus rose 37.6% last year, to a record \$107.06 billion; the surplus with the US rose to \$43.67 billion, below the record \$52.09 billion in 1987.

Jan. 29—Retaliating for what it considers "dumping," the government imposes a tariff on Chinese producers of a material used in steelmaking; this is the 1st time Japan has imposed such a tariff.

## KENYA

Jan. 1—In Nairobi, the leaders of the 3 largest opposition parties—Mwai Kibaki of the Democratic party, and Oginga Odinga and Kenneth Matiba, who head rival factions of the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy—announce they will not accept the results from the December 29 general elections, which they claim were rigged, and say they will not assume their seats in the legislature.

## KUWAIT

(See also *Intl, UN, Iraq, US*)

Jan. 17—The Interior Ministry reports that 1 Iraqi was killed, 1 wounded, and another escaped after they crossed into Kuwait and fired on a Kuwaiti border post.

Information Minister Sheik Saud Nasser al-Saud al-Sabah says Iraq has begun dismantling 6 Iraqi police posts on Kuwaiti territory, in compliance with UN resolutions.

## LAOS

Jan. 14—The *Far Eastern Economic Review* reports that on December 19 state radio announced that 3 former officials who had called for democracy have been sentenced to 14 years in prison for "making preparations to stage a rebellion and for conducting propaganda" against the government.

## LEBANON

(See also *Israel*)

Jan. 3—The Israeli-backed South Lebanon Army and Israeli soldiers fire artillery rounds near a camp just outside Israel's self-declared "security zone" where 413 Palestinians have lived since last month after being deported by the Israeli government for being suspected members of Muslim fundamentalist groups; army spokesmen say "suspicious movement" near the zone was the reason for the attack, in which no one was injured.

Jan. 10—Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri says the government has banned airlifts by the International Committee of the Red Cross that would return any of the 413 Palestinians to Israel and says the refugees will have to reenter Israeli-held territory by an overland route.

Jan. 18—At the Ain Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp, the largest in the country, 4 bombs go off, wounding 4 people; government officials say this is the latest in attacks by rival militant factions that have claimed at least 2 lives in the last week.

Jan. 23—Israeli artillery shells a position held by the Iranian-backed Party of God in retaliation for the killing of 1 soldier and the wounding of 2 others by a bomb blast in the security zone.

Jan. 26—The army says it confiscated a variety of heavy and light weapons in an overnight raid in Sidon on hideouts of the People's Army, a militia belonging to the anti-Israeli Popular Nasserite Organization.

## LUXEMBOURG

(See *Intl, EC*)

## MEXICO

(See *Guatemala*)

**NETHERLANDS**

(See Intl, EC)

**NORWAY**

(See Intl, Council of the Euro-Arctic Region)

**PAKISTAN**

Jan. 23—In Hyderabad, a city in Sind province dominated by Urdu-speaking Mohajir immigrants from India, bombs planted in 2 shopping centers explode, killing at least 15 people and wounding more than 100; a bomb explosion in the town of Kotri on January 10, the day Urdu-speaking Bihar refugees arrived in Punjab province from Bangladesh, killed 13 people. The Mohajir National Movement party has been a target of an army-led crackdown in Sind province.

**PERU**

- Jan. 9—At least 3 rebels, 2 police officers, and 1 civilian are killed in an attack on the northeastern city of Moyobamba by Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement guerrillas.
- Jan. 22—Car bombs set by the Maoist Shining Path rebel group explode at 2 Coca-Cola plants in Lima, the capital, killing 2 people.
- Jan. 27—In Lima, a bomb planted by the Shining Path explodes at the headquarters of President Alberto Fujimori's Cambio '90 party; no injuries are reported.
- Jan. 28—In a suburb of the capital, Shining Path rebels detonate an explosives-laden pickup truck outside IBM's headquarters in Peru, wounding 15 people and damaging 50 homes; the guerrillas also kill a candidate who was running in mayoral elections to be held tomorrow in Lima.
- Jan. 29—On a day of municipal elections throughout the country, Shining Path guerrillas dynamite 2 buses in Lima, killing 1 driver, in an attempt to force an "armed strike" against the balloting.

**PORTUGAL**

(See Intl, EC)

**SAUDI ARABIA**

(See UK)

**SLOVAKIA**

(See also Czechoslovakia)

Jan. 1—In a New Year's Day speech, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar rejects for his new country Czechoslovakian policies that established a free market economy and banned former Communists from top government positions.

**SLOVENIA**

Jan. 25—The 90-member parliament approves a coalition government with former president Janez Drnovsek as prime minister; Foreign Minister Lojze Peterle, a Christian Democrat, is the only member of the new cabinet who is not a former Communist.

**SOMALIA**

- Jan. 2—A British employee of the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) is shot to death in the southern port of Kismayu by Somali gunmen.
- Jan. 7—At least 15 Somalis surrender after about 400 US marines—backed by tanks, artillery, and helicopters—stage an attack on gunmen who fired on them from a compound controlled by General Mohammed Farah Aidid, leader of 1 of the country's 2 largest factions; a large cache of war matériel is confiscated in the assault, which produces an unreported number of Somali casualties.

- Jan. 11—Nearly 1,000 US troops from the 32,000-member multinational mission in Somalia raid the Bakara market in central Mogadishu, the largest arms market in the capital, seizing tons of weapons and ammunition; 3 days ago marines staged a raid on another city arms market; before today US-led forces had confiscated only weapons considered a direct threat. An estimated 100,000 Somalis are under arms.
- Jan. 12—A US marine is shot and killed in a gunfight with Somalis near the Mogadishu airport; this is the 1st American combat death in the month-old coalition mission to ensure delivery of relief supplies to famine-stricken Somalia.
- Jan. 15—At a meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, leaders of the 14 principal factions in Somalia's 2-year-old civil war sign an agreement calling for an immediate cease-fire and general disarmament by early March. On January 8 the factions said they would open a national reconciliation conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on March 15 and would cooperate with relief agencies working in Somalia.
- Jan. 24—In 4 separate incidents in Mogadishu, at least 3 Somalis are killed and 5 wounded by coalition troops.
- Jan. 25—US helicopters attack troops of General Mohammed Siad Hersi, the son-in-law of ousted ruler Mohammed Siad Barre, after the rebels fail to heed warnings to stop their advance on the southern city of Kismayu; Reuters news agency says 42 Somalis were wounded. A US marine on patrol is shot and killed in Mogadishu.
- Jan. 31—At the compound of US envoy Robert Oakley, former police officials announce the revival of the police, with weapons and advice provided by the multinational force.

**SOUTH AFRICA**

(See also Angola)

Jan. 29—President F. W. de Klerk convenes what may be the last session of the racially segregated parliament; in a speech, he tells members that before the body adjourns in June he expects it to have approved legislation transferring some executive powers to a multiracial transition committee that will prepare for the country's 1st universal elections, planned for early next year; in that balloting, voters will select an assembly that will write a new constitution and serve as an interim government. De Klerk also says he will ask parliament to enact a constitutional bill of rights before the transfer of power.

**SPAIN**

(See Intl, EC)

**SRI LANKA**

Jan. 16—Off the southern Indian port of Madras, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam blow up a ship carrying weapons for their rebel group after Indian navy vessels surround it; Sathasivam Krishnakumar ("Kittu"), a Tamil guerrilla leader, is killed, along with 10 other high-ranking rebels.

**SWEDEN**

(See Intl, Council of the Euro-Arctic Region)

**SWITZERLAND**

(See Intl, EC)

**TAIWAN**

Jan. 30—Prime Minister Hau Pei-Tsun announces he will resign; the cabinet will also hand in their resignations; the liberal wing of Hau's Nationalist party and the Democratic Progressive party, the main opposition, have criticized Hau for attempting to block democratization that began in 1987.

## Togo

Jan. 26—French Cooperation Minister Marcel Debarge reports that police in Lomé, the capital, yesterday shot and killed at least 20 pro-democracy demonstrators; Debarge and German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Helmut Schäffer were in the country to mediate between President Gnassingbe Eyadéma and opponents who want to end his military rule; to protest the police action, the 2 officials left Togo today.

## TURKEY

Jan. 27—More than 200,000 people, many of them chanting slogans against Iran and Islamic fundamentalism, attend the Ankara funeral of Ugur Mumcu, a journalist for a left-wing newspaper, who was killed by a car bomb January 24; 3 little-known Islamic fundamentalist groups claimed responsibility for the attack.

## UNITED KINGDOM (UK)

(See also Intl, EC, UN; Iraq)

### Great Britain

Jan. 12—The oil tanker *Braer*, which ran aground off the Shetland Islands nearly a week ago, breaks up, spilling the last of its 26-million-gallon cargo into the North Sea.

Jan. 28—In Riyadh, the British and Saudi governments announce Saudi Arabia will purchase about 48 Tornado ground attack planes and other British military hardware worth as much as \$7.5 billion; Saudi Arabia has already signed a \$15-billion contract for British military aircraft and minesweepers.

## UNITED STATES (US)

(See also Intl, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, UN; Canada; Iraq; Somalia)

Jan. 3—In Moscow, President George Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin sign the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), which calls for reducing the number of US nuclear warheads to 3,500 and the number of Russian warheads to 3,000 by 2003; the agreement will also eliminate all land-based multiple warhead missiles.

Jan. 5—Near Miami, the Coast Guard intercepts a freighter carrying 352 Haitian refugees and takes them into custody; more than 150 Haitians at the Krome detention center in Florida have been on a hunger strike to protest the May 1992 Bush directive that boats carrying Haitian refugees be escorted back to Haiti; the strike began soon after a December 29 incident in which a pilot hijacked a plane on a domestic flight in Cuba and flew it to Miami; 47 Cuban passengers were allowed to apply for political asylum; 5 of the people aboard chose to return to Cuba.

The House of Representatives approves a measure that gives full voting rights in the House to representatives from Washington, D. C., and 4 American territories (Guam, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, and the American Virgin Islands).

Jan. 7—The *Far Eastern Economic Review* reports that on December 22 the Bush administration quietly lifted a ban on military technology sales to China that had been imposed after the June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre.

Jan. 11—The Coast Guard returns 226 Haitian refugees and investigates reports of a boat that sank off the Bahamas last month; Cuban authorities have told the Coast Guard they rescued 8 of the reported 396 Haitians aboard; more than 31,000 people have fled Haiti since the September 1991 military ouster of elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

Coast Guard officials say they helped tow a Cuban fishing

vessel to Key West, Florida, last week after a group of Cubans tied up the captain, commandeered the craft, and sailed for US waters on January 7; the 14 passengers were released to a Cuban refugee center in Key West on January 10; the captain returned to Cuba.

Jan. 13—Bush announces that approximately 1,250 US troops will be sent to Kuwait in an effort to deter Iraqi aggression against the emirate.

Jan. 14—In a radio message broadcast to Haiti and Haitian communities in the US, President-elect Bill Clinton announces he will reverse a campaign pledge to grant political-asylum hearings for Haitians and will instead continue what he had called the Bush administration's "cruel policy of returning Haitian refugees to a brutal dictatorship without an asylum hearing."

Jan. 19—A human rights survey of 189 countries issued by the State Department today calls Serbia-dominated Yugoslavia's campaign against civilian populations in Bosnia and Herzegovina "a mockery" of the Geneva Conventions on war; it states that "the policy of driving out innocent civilians of a different ethnic or religious group from their homes, so-called ethnic cleansing, was practiced by Serbian forces in Bosnia on a scale that dwarfs anything seen in Europe since Nazi times."

Jan. 20—In Washington, Bill Clinton is sworn in as the 42d president; Albert Gore, Jr., becomes vice president.

North of Haiti, the Coast Guard intercepts and returns a boat carrying 163 Haitian refugees.

Jan. 22—Clinton signs 4 memorandums that remove several restrictions on abortion, including a prohibition on abortion counseling in federally funded clinics, a ban on aid to family planning programs abroad that encompass abortion-related activities, and some limits in abortion policy at military hospitals. The action also lifts restrictions on federal funding for fetal-tissue research.

## YUGOSLAVIA

(See also US)

Jan. 11—The election commission in Montenegro—the republic that along with Serbia constitutes the country—announces that President Momir Bulatovic was reelected with 63% of the vote in yesterday's runoff election; Bulatovic's pro-Serbian nationalist opponent, Branko Kostic, received 37% of ballots cast.

## ZAIRE

(See also Angola)

Jan. 31—In Kinshasa, the capital, 4 days of rioting by troops and attacks by loyalist soldiers on the homes of President Mobutu Sese Seko's political opponents have left at least 100 troops and civilians dead and hundreds injured; on January 28 the French ambassador to Zaire, Philippe Bernard, was killed in a machine-gun attack on the French embassy as soldiers protested being paid in bank notes Seko had introduced earlier in the week; the next day Seko annulled a decree by Prime Minister Etienne Tshisekedi, the head of the transitional government, withdrawing the bank notes from circulation. ■

**Erratum:** Because of an editing error, the article by Volker Perthes in our January 1993 issue states that Syria no longer demands that UN resolutions 242 and 338 provide the basis for any peace negotiations. Syria has not made such a concession. We regret the error.





## CURRENT HISTORY IN APRIL: NEW WORLD ENTROPY

The end of the cold war poses more questions than it answers: What dilemmas present themselves to a generation shaped by cold war thinking? What does this problem of reorientation presage for the world's security? How many more atrocities are in store for Europe and the former Soviet republics as intolerant nationalism accelerates? And how have relations between the developed and the developing nations changed since the bipolar world disappeared? What are the prospects for protecting the environment while "growing" our economies? Finally, how will the United States meet the challenges that confront the remaining superpower? *Topics scheduled to be covered include:*

- **Redefining the Global Political Landscape**  
BY RICHARD FALK, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
- **The Developing World Looks North**  
BY DEEPA OLLAPALLY, SWARTHMORE COLLEGE
- **Arms Control, Arms Proliferation, and the Search for New Security Regimes**  
BY MICHAEL KLARE, HAMPSHIRE COLLEGE
- **Not Easy Being Green: Sustainable Development in the 1990s**  
BY STEPHEN VIEDERMAN, JESSIE SMYTH NOYES FOUNDATION
- **Nationalism Redux: The Not-So-New Face of Hate**  
BY STEVEN BURG, BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY
- **What Course for the United States?**  
BY GADDIS SMITH, YALE UNIVERSITY

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